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HOME, HOME ON THE WEB AND OTHER FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOSOCIAL CHANGE
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG*
Moira wakes up in the one-bedroom apartment she shares with a
roommate.  She makes up the sofa bed she sleeps on in the living
room and says good morning to her roommate, who is heading out
the door.  It is not quite time to leave for work, so she reads a novel on
her Kindle for a few minutes before going online to check the
weather, to look at her web-based calendar, and to check her e-mail.
On her way to work, she listens to her iPod and stops at a favorite
coffee shop, using her smart phone to check Foursquare just in case
any of her friends are in the vicinity and want to join her for a latte.
At work, Moira uses a cloud computing service to collaborate with col-
leagues in another state on drafting a report.  During lunchtime, she
orders food delivered to the office and spends some time catching up
with family and friends on Facebook.  She responds to her sister’s wall
post about Thanksgiving plans, joins a political debate with some ac-
quaintances, posts the latest pictures from her vacation, and sends a
private message to her boyfriend, who lives in another city, suggesting
that they stream the same movie from Netflix that evening while si-
multaneously video chatting via Skype.  She also posts a link to a re-
view of a play she is interested in seeing, customizes the post so that it
is visible to a Friend List she has made called “Going Out Friends,”
and asks whether any of those friends want to attend it the following
evening.  While she is online, she sees that she has two friend re-
quests—one from a high school friend she has not seen in ten years
and one from a guy she met briefly at a party last week.  She “accepts”
the request from the high school friend and “ignores” the request
from the party guy.  Meanwhile, a couple of people have responded to
her post about the play.  They make plans to meet after work for din-
ner and to go to the play.  Moira posts that she will go on Yelp to find
a restaurant close to the theater and will text everyone the location
after work the following day.  When Moira leaves a couple of days later
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to spend the weekend with her boyfriend, she takes her laptop, her
smart phone, her iPod, and her Kindle with her.  The Fourth Amend-
ment protects Moira’s sleeping space in the living room from warrant-
less government intrusions.  But what of the rest of her life?
I. INTRODUCTION
The first decade of the twenty-first century was bookended by the
Supreme Court’s two most recent attempts to deal with the effects of
advancing technology on the law of search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.1  Both opinions notably recognize the impor-
tance of interpreting the law so as to maintain the Amendment’s pro-
tection against government intrusions into personal life in the face of
technological changes, yet they illustrate very different perspectives on
how that should be done.
In City of Ontario v. Quon,2 the Supreme Court faced the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment protects a police officer’s text
messages to his girlfriend from a search by his government employer.3
The factual situation was complicated by the government employment
context.  As a result, the unanimous holding that the search was rea-
sonable focused on the impact of office policies about the use of the
government-provided pager,4 and the Court avoided deciding
whether the officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
messages.5  Nonetheless, in a part of the opinion joined by every Jus-
tice except Justice Scalia, the Court mused at length upon the reason-
able expectation of privacy question.6
That discussion is notable in at least three respects.  First, in a
manner reminiscent of the Court’s recognition of “the vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in private communication” in
the seminal case Katz v. United States,7 the Supreme Court emphasized
the social role played by text message communications, noting:
1. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010) (considering whether the
Fourth Amendment protects “text messages sent and received on a pager [an] employer
owned and issued to an employee”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (consid-
ering “whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public
street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2619.
3. Id. at 2624–26.
4. Id. at 2624–25, 2633.
5. Id. at 2632.
6. Id. at 2629–30.
7. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and
information transmission are evident not just in the technol-
ogy itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.
. . .  Cell phone and text message communications are
so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be es-
sential means or necessary instruments for self-expression,
even self-identification.  That might strengthen the case for
an expectation of privacy.  On the other hand, the ubiquity
of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one
could counter that employees who need cell phones or simi-
lar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for
their own.8
Second, the Court expressed discomfort with its role as arbiter of
the place of new technologies in social life:
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear.  In Katz, the
Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to con-
clude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
telephone booth.  It is not so clear that courts at present are
on so sure a ground.  Prudence counsels caution before the
facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching
premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy ex-
pectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-pro-
vided communication devices.9
Third, and perhaps most remarkable in light of scholarly conster-
nation about the possibility that the “third party doctrine” might de-
prive virtually all digital communications of Fourth Amendment
protection,10 the Court completely ignored the third party doctrine11
8. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629–30.
9. Id. at 2629 (citations omitted).
10. For generally critical discussions see, for example, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY
AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 17 (2007)
(“Most fundamentally, this chapter argues that when contemplating surveillance (or any
other investigative technique), government should be required to provide justification pro-
portionate to the intrusiveness of the surveillance and to seek third-party authorization in
all nonexigent circumstances.”); Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 149 (suggesting that reading a broad
third party rule into Supreme Court jurisprudence is inappropriate); Richard A. Epstein,
Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1202 (2009) (suggesting that an alternative set of rules that produces
the best mix of privacy and security is preferable to the reasonable expectations test); Su-
san Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact,
70 MD. L. REV. 681, 689 (2011) (discussing the inordinate appeal of the third party rule in
“federal appellate resolution of the Fourth Amendment question in the location privacy
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and did not mention the cases upon which its application to Internet
intermediaries is said to rest, Smith v. Maryland12 and United States v.
Miller.13  Those opinions have led many to assume that activities in-
volving intermediate storage of digital information by a service pro-
vider (essentially all online activity) would be unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment.14  As the Court stated in Miller,
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
cases”); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 977 (2007) (suggesting
a factor-based approach to the third party doctrine); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case
for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1247
(2009) (noting that the third party doctrine does not afford technological neutrality or ex
ante clarity, as well as suggesting that an elimination of the doctrine may create socioeco-
nomic equality); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 546 (2006) (noting that the reasoning behind the third party
doctrine is “exceptionally strained”); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapt-
ing the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321–35
(2002) (criticizing methods-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and instead advocat-
ing for a results-based application of the Katz test); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Sur-
veillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 167–69 (2005) [hereinafter Slobogin,
Transaction Surveillance by the Government] (arguing that “[t]he degree to which transaction
surveillance is regulated” should depend on “the type of information sought” and the type
of surveillance at issue); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amend-
ment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1138 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers] (not-
ing the significant privacy threat posed by a third party doctrine approach to digital
information); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748 (2005) [hereinafter Solove, Fourth
Amendment] (noting the Supreme Court’s difficulty in applying the Fourth Amendment to
information and the resultant dependence on statutes for protection); Matthew D. Lawless,
Comment, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case for a “Crazy
Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2007, at 1, 2–4, http://
www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2007/02_070426_lawless.pdf (noting the inadequacy of
both the statutory and constitutional regimes to address Internet privacy).  For a defense of
the third party doctrine, see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 563–66 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine] (arguing that
critics of the third party doctrine overlook substantial benefits); Orin S. Kerr, Defending the
Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229, 1229
(2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine] (suggesting that the third party
doctrine furthers technological neutrality and ensures ex ante clarity of the Fourth
Amendment).
11. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (failing to consider the third party doctrine in the Court’s
opinion).
12. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
13. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 10, at 1135 (“Individuals thus probably R
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications and records main-
tained by ISPs or computer network system administrators.”).
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will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.15
Persons making phone calls and bank deposits were said to have as-
sumed the risk that those to whom they had, in the ordinary course of
business, conveyed the numbers they dialed and the content of their
bank records would disclose them.16 Miller and Smith held that this
risk of disclosure vitiated an individual’s expectation of privacy.17
While the Quon Court ultimately declined to rule on the expecta-
tion of privacy in intermediated digital communications, such as text
messages and e-mail, its failure to dismiss the claim out of hand on the
basis of the third party doctrine suggests that, in the long run, the
Supreme Court is likely to hold that the mere fact of digital intermedi-
ation does not remove all reasonable expectation of privacy, at least in
some important social contexts.
Kyllo v. United States,18 decided at the dawn of this century, took a
very different approach.  There, Justice Scalia, writing for a divided
Court, held that the warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device to
detect suspicious heat patterns suggesting the cultivation of marijuana
within a home violated the Fourth Amendment.19  In asking “what
limits there are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy,” the Court defined its role as one not of adapting
to the changing role of technology, but of preserving the privacy citi-
zens had been able to rely on in the past.20  The Court opined:
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a consti-
tutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.  This assures preservation of that degree of pri-
vacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.21
In reaffirming the central position of the home as a bastion of Fourth
Amendment privacy, the majority saw itself as drawing a line at the
entrance to the home that “must be not only firm but also bright.”22
15. 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
16. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
17. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
18. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
19. Id. at 40.
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 40.
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These two very different opinions both tend toward the protec-
tion of privacy in the face of new technology, but they take very differ-
ent routes: one seeks primarily to preserve the constitutionally
protected spaces of yesterday,23 while the other recognizes the need to
adapt to the changing social behavior engendered by technology.24
In this Article, I argue that a future is nearly upon us that will make it
impossible to preserve the privacy even of traditional Fourth Amend-
ment bastions, such as the home, without considering the intertwined
effects of technological and social change.  Courts therefore should
apply a principle of “technosocial continuity” when interpreting the
Fourth Amendment’s protections in a world of rapidly evolving tech-
nology.25  Technosocial continuity requires that courts consider both
the ways in which technology facilitates intrusive surveillance and the
ways in which technology spurs social change that may make citizens
more vulnerable to existing surveillance technologies.
Though much of the discussion of digital privacy focuses on
“communication,”26 the Internet has evolved into a place with an ex-
ploding variety of contexts in which a full panoply of human behavior
takes place.  There are social network sites featuring everything from
two-way communications, to gathering places for groups of friends, to
political meeting spaces, to commercial fan pages.  There are chat
rooms, places for storing one’s personal library, documents, and fi-
23. Id.
24. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
25. This approach contrasts with the “technological neutrality” principle recently advo-
cated by Professor Orin S. Kerr.  Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, A General Approach].  Pro-
fessor Kerr focuses on the Internet as a communication technology and advocates the ap-
plication of a content/noncontent distinction as a proxy for a supposed inside/outside
distinction, which he argues reflects the Fourth Amendment’s application in the physical
world. Id. at 1017–29.  As discussed in Part IV, a content/noncontent distinction is not
sufficiently cognizant of the complexities of technosocial changes.  Professor Kerr puts too
much weight on maintaining law enforcement effectiveness in response to the ways in
which wrongdoers use the Internet and insufficient weight on the evolving social role of
digital technology more generally. See id. at 1015–16, 1048.  The Fourth Amendment bal-
ance is not geared toward ensuring a constant level of crime control; it is geared to ensur-
ing “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The effect of a par-
ticular type of intrusion made possible by emerging technology on “the security of the
people” cannot be evaluated without an understanding of the role that the technology
plays in the people’s social life.  For a similar argument, see A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709
(1995).
26. See, e.g., Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1007–08 (suggesting that individ-
uals should have a reasonable expectation in the contents of their online communications,
as distinguished from noncontent information).
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nancial and health records, and location-based mechanisms for mov-
ing from online interactions to real world interactions and back
again.27  There is every reason to believe that the social framework of
the Internet will continue to evolve in complexity and variety.  While
early theorists of “cyberspace” saw it as a country of its own—a land
with the potential to transcend many of the limitations, both physical
and social, of the real world28—the Internet is evolving into a seamless
27. For some discussions of the growth and social role of social network sites and social
media in general, see, for example, Mitja D. Back et al., Facebook Profiles Reflect Actual
Personality, Not Self-Idealization, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 372, 372 (2010), http://pss.sagepub.com/
content/21/3/372.full.pdf (noting that online social networks “have become integrated
into the milieu of modern-day social interactions”); H. Brian Holland, Privacy Paradox 2.0,
19 WIDENER L.J. 893, 894 (2010) (describing the privacy implications of the emergence of
social networks); danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History,
and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (Oct. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/
vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html (describing the history of social networks and their grow-
ing importance); Pedro de Gouveia, The Four Most Popular Social Networking Sites, BIZCOM-
MUNITY.COM (Dec. 14, 2007, 9:00 AM), http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/16/
20623.html (noting the popularity of social networking sites).  For more specific discus-
sions of the privacy implications of social media, see, for example, David S. Ardia, Reputa-
tion in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010) (discussing the inadequacies of defamation law in an increas-
ingly networked world); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Net-
works, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2009) (discussing the problems of protecting privacy in
the age of social networks and the prevalence of online divulgence of personal informa-
tion); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1141–42 (2009) (dis-
cussing various policy proposals concerning Facebook privacy); Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy
2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 65 (noting that the Internet puts individuals in a better
position “to compromise privacy than the government and commercial institutions”).
28. For a recent description and review of the evolution of this debate, see H. Brian
Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Excep-
tionalism, 56 KAN. L. REV. 369 (2008) (describing the development of the Internet govern-
ance debate in terms of Internet exceptionalism and network architecture).  Indeed, there
are entire online worlds, in which people create elaborate simulated artifacts and engage
in complex and ongoing social interactions while adopting alternative “avatar” personae.
Very interesting legal questions arise in such spaces. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN & BETH SI-
MONE NOVECK, THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 3, 3 (Jack M. Balkin
& Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (noting that millions of people “spend more time in
virtual environments than they do at their real-world jobs or engaged with their real-world
communities”); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (questioning whether virtual objects constitute legal property and
whether democracy and governance may be applied to social conflicts in the virtual world).
New York Law School has held an annual conference on these issues since 2003. State of
Play, INST. FOR INFO., L. & POL’Y, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan_
scholar_centers/institute_for_information_law_and_policy/events/state_of_play (last vis-
ited Mar. 2, 2011).  But the use of avatars and virtual artifacts to make online interactions
more “real” is not confined to these virtual worlds.  The lines between real world and on-
line social interactions are likely to blur even more as the technologies developed for on-
line games migrate to other kinds of interactions. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom
of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2008)
(discussing three-dimensional virtual reality); M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New
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part of the real world, complete with an abundant variety of social and
personal contexts.29  Whether we understand the goals of the Fourth
Amendment in terms of privacy, autonomy and personhood, liberty,
security, or power, the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted with
sensitivity to the social significance of each of these contexts if we are
to effectuate its guarantees.30
In the context of the home, Kyllo’s mistake in attempting to artic-
ulate a rule for updating traditional protections is in assuming that a
line which is “firm” in protecting the traditional social role of the
home can also be “bright” at the doorstep of a physical residence.31
Kyllo’s bright line at the door of the physical home, which seeks simply
to protect the traditional locus of privacy from technological en-
croachment,32 will be insufficient if we hope to extend meaningful
Fourth Amendment protection into a networked world in which tech-
nology and social behavior are co-evolving.33  Rather, courts should
adopt an approach of technosocial continuity, recognizing that inter-
twined technological and social changes require not only the protec-
tion of privacy in conventional social contexts against technological
intrusions, but also the adaptation of privacy protections to the evolu-
tion of social context and governing social norms.  As in Kyllo, courts
Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 811 (2010) (noting
that humans react to technological facsimiles “as though a person were actually present”).
29. See, e.g., de Gouveia, supra note 27 (noting the popularity of social networking R
websites).
30. The principle of technosocial continuity advocated here is not intended as a new
theory of the Fourth Amendment in the sense of delineating its proper goals, though my
applications of the principle to the home and office in Part V necessarily rely on judgments
about the values underlying traditional Fourth Amendment protections of those arenas.
The technosocial continuity principle is consistent with and arguably necessary to imple-
ment a variety of theories, such as those focusing on protecting privacy, limiting govern-
ment power, increasing the security of the citizenry, and so forth. See, e.g., Thomas P.
Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2009) (focusing on liberty); Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of
Cognitive Freedom and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV.
803, 812 (2009) (considering Margaret Radin’s property and personhood paradigm); Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (focusing on the “a right of
security” and the prohibition on general warrants); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1325, 1326 (2002) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s protection from government
“power” as opposed to “privacy”).  The principle is inconsistent only with the most strictly
textualist approach, which would foreclose the Court’s ruling in Katz, as well.
31. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (noting that the line drawn at the
doorstep of the home should be “firm” as well as “bright”).
32. Id.
33. See Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1018 (suggesting a content/noncon- R
tent distinction in the online world in place of the inside/outside distinction in the physi-
cal world).
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should not assume that every technological means of tracking or ana-
lyzing data that is available to the government is constitutionally rea-
sonable without appropriate legal justification (a warrant, reasonable
suspicion, or some other Fourth Amendment standard).  As in Katz v.
United States,34 courts should be sensitive to the ways in which technol-
ogy frames social behavior.
In this Article, I exemplify the technosocial continuity principle
with a specific application to cloud computing and social media in
relation to the home and office.  Part II discusses the rise of social
media and cloud computing.  It makes two related points: First, the
Internet and other digital technology have had dramatic effects on
daily life and social interactions.  Second, and at the same time, In-
ternet exceptionalism is no longer a viable position.  The Internet is
not a separate and distinct place.  It is neither a cyberspace utopia35
nor a realm in which citizens should have to accept that they “have
zero privacy” and “[g]et over it.”36  It is a part of the social realm, in
which courts will have to struggle with the same kinds of questions
about privacy and government intrusion that they have always con-
fronted.  Part III describes the ways in which the co-evolution of tech-
nology and society raises two intertwined challenges to the Fourth
Amendment’s application.  Part IV considers the infamous third party
doctrine, which is the basis for most Internet exceptionalism claims
on both sides of the digital Fourth Amendment debate.  It argues that
aggressive interpretations are overblown in light of Supreme Court
case law in the offline world and unlikely to prevail in the long (or
even short) run.  It also rejects the argument that a “content/noncon-
tent” distinction will be sufficient to deal with the Fourth Amendment
in the Internet context.37  Part V focuses on two core Fourth Amend-
ment protected areas, the home and the office.  It argues that
technosocial continuity requires that conceptions of the home and of-
fice be extended to encompass certain digital social contexts.  It then
applies these ideas specifically to two issues: the plain view doctrine in
the context of cloud computing and the application of the Fourth
Amendment to undercover policing and the use of informants on so-
cial network sites.  Part V identifies some of the complexities sur-
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 217–18 (2007)
[hereinafter Cohen, Cyberspace] (noting the interconnectedness of cyberspace and real
space).
36. See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: “Get Over It,” WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), http://www.
wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (internal quotation marks omitted) (re-
porting widely quoted comment by Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy).
37. See, e.g., Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25. R
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rounding extension of the protection of the home into the networked
world.  Part VI concludes.
II. THE SEAMLESS WEB
Not so long ago the world wide web seemed like a relatively sim-
ple place (though it may not have been so simple even at the time!).38
There were websites, which displayed content that was posted by web-
site owners and visible to anyone with an Internet connection and a
browser.39  There was e-mail, which was hosted by commercial In-
ternet service providers (“ISPs”) or private entities, such as corpora-
tions and universities.40  Eventually, there were search engines that
helped people to find websites in which they were interested.41  So-
cially, the Internet was a discrete place to which one went for specific
purposes: to search for news or commercial information, to check e-
mail, or perhaps to participate in a chat room or electronic bulletin
board on a topic of interest.42
In the past few years all of that has changed at an absolutely dizzy-
ing pace.  Commercial transactions have moved online to the point
where one can (and many do) order virtually any product—including
books, movies, groceries, restaurant take-out, airline tickets, hotel res-
ervations, and prescription drugs—over the Internet.43  Personal and
business activities blur the line between online and offline.44  Docu-
ments are created, edited, and stored, and computations are per-
formed “in the cloud.”45  Online banking, including bill payment, is
38. See Kai Zhu, Bringing Neutrality to Network Neutrality, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 616
(2007) (“The architects of the original internet did not and could not envision the many
new technologies and applications that are now common for the internet.”).
39. Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyber-
space, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1214–16 (2002) (providing a brief overview of the his-
tory of the Internet).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. And, of course, as Avenue Q has reminded us beginning in 2002, “The Internet is
for porn.” AVENUE Q, The Internet Is for Porn, on AVENUE Q: THE MUSICAL, ORIGINAL BROAD-
WAY CAST RECORDING (RCA Victor 2003). AVENUE Q’S light-hearted take on this issue is
itself sadly anachronistic in light of the serious issues with online harassment of women
and minorities that have accompanied the evolution of the Internet into a social space.
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
43. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 19 (2007) (“If you are interested in
anything at all—from computers to linens to diamonds to cars to medical advice—an on-
line company will be happy to assist you.”).
44. Id. at 19–20.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 211–16. R
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routine.46  Books are read on various electronic devices, synchronized
by records kept online.47  The bookcase, the CD shelf, and the DVD
collection are being supplemented—and in some cases supplanted—
by online archives and delivery services.48
The social Internet expands at an equally amazing rate.49  E-mail
is supplemented by instant messaging, text messaging, video chat,
sharing of cell phone photos and videos among families and friends,
and on and on.  Social media from MySpace to Facebook to Twitter to
Foursquare and beyond offer a growing variety of ways to socialize,
conduct business, and organize political and other groups.  These on-
line social connections are not divorced from the real world.  Instead,
they mirror and enhance offline connections, allowing families,
friends, and colleagues to remain in touch over the years in a highly
mobile society.50  Of course, intimate relationships also make use of
all these means of keeping in touch.51  Although such things as “sext-
ing,” the sharing of sexually explicit photos, and the use of webcams
for sexual interactions make headlines in connection with child por-
nography, pedophilia, and concerns about early teenage sexuality,52
46. See News Release: ABA Survey Shows More Consumers Prefer Online Banking, AM. BANKERS
ASSOC. (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/093010PreferredBanking
Method.htm (stating that online banking is most customers’ preferred method of
banking).
47. See Bob Minzesheimer, E-Book Wave Now a Tsunami, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Nov. 5, 2010,
12:12 PM), http://www.suntimes.com/business/2829174,CST-NWS-ebook24.article (not-
ing that e-book sales are up 193% over a year ago).
48. See Jeffrey O. Valisno, The Day the Music [Store] Died, BUS. WORLD WEEKENDER (Oct.
7, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://www.bworldonline.com/weekender/content.php?id=19104
(calling “the advent of portable digital music players . . . the greatest upheaval in music
retailing since video killed the radio star”).
49. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. R
50. See, e.g., KEITH N. HAMPTON ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL ISOLA-
TION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: HOW THE INTERNET AND MOBILE PHONES IMPACT AMERICANS’
SOCIAL NETWORKS 3–4 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//
Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdf (noting that Internet users have a
more diverse social network and participate more in public places); MARY MADDEN, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, OLDER ADULTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA: SOCIAL NETWORKING USE
AMONG THOSE AGES 50 AND OLDER NEARLY DOUBLED OVER THE PAST YEAR 2–3 (Aug. 27,
2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/Pew%20Inter
net%20-%20Older%20Adults%20and%20Social%20Media.pdf (noting that older Internet
users have been especially enthusiastic in recent years); Jeffrey Boase & Barry Wellman,
Personal Relationships: On and Off the Internet, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS 709, 715–17 (Anita L. Vangelisti & Daniel Perlman eds., 2006) (noting that
the Internet is most often used to contact those with whom people have offline relation-
ships); Barry Wellman, Studying the Internet Studies Through the Ages, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNET STUDIES 17 (2009).
51. See supra note 50. R
52. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children
Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
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there is every reason to think that digital modes of interaction are part
of many legitimate adult sexual relationships as well.53  Online pat-
terns of association are increasingly linked to users’ activities in the
offline world: Individuals carry the Internet with them in their pockets
linked via smart phones, iPads, and Kindles.  These devices not only
bring the online world to their users but also make location data avail-
able for various purposes ranging from restaurant recommendations,
to advertising, to facilitating offline social interactions.54
As is the case with any new arena for social interaction, whether it
is a new geographic location or a new technological platform, society
carries with it the potential for antisocial and criminal behavior.55  Of
course, that antisocial and criminal behavior adapts to the technologi-
cal and social context, creating both new and unsurprising
problems.56
This story is far from over (and probably out of date even as this is
published).  And it means that both those who took the Internet ex-
ceptionalism position and those who insisted that the Internet was just
a new means of communication got it partly right.  In some respects,
“the more things change the more they stay the same” still rings true.
The Internet is not “the wild, wild West” any more than the West re-
mained that way for long.57  But it is not a simple replica of the pre-
1, 9–11 (2009) (discussing the prevalence of sexting among teenagers); Amy F. Kimpel,
Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon: Prosecuting Minors Under Child Pornography Laws,
34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299, 323–26 (2010) (discussing the prosecution of mi-
nors under child pornography laws for possessing or distributing explicit images of them-
selves); danah michele boyd, Taken Out of Context: American Teen Sociality in
Networked Publics 151–67 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/TakenOutOfContext.pdf (dis-
cussing privacy and safety concerns with increased teenager involvement on social
networking websites).
53. Indeed, even a recent episode of the NBC network television show Parenthood al-
luded to “Skype sex” in a serious long-distance relationship. Parenthood: I Hear You, I See
You (NBC television broadcast Sept. 14, 2010).
54. See, e.g., Janice Y. Tsai et al., Location-Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and Controls, 6
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 119, 120–23 (2010) (“These technologies, also referred to
as mobile location technologies, social mobile applications, or simply location-based ser-
vices (“LBS”), typically allow users to share their real-time or historical location informa-
tion online.”).
55. See, e.g., Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1044–48 (discussing the difficul- R
ties of the warrant requirement when dealing with Internet criminals); Peter Swire, No Cop
on the Beat: Underenforcement in E-Commerce and Cybercrime, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
107, 119–20 (2009) (discussing the difficulty of tracking Internet criminals because they
are more similar to “mice” than “elephants” like Amazon and eBay).
56. Cf. supra note 55. R
57. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 401 (2009) (“The West is no longer wild: society long ago subjected
it to the rule of law.”).
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Internet offline world either.  It is not just that “the Internet is differ-
ent”; it is that the Internet, like every major advance in infrastructural
technology before it, has made everything different.
III. THE INTERTWINED STRANDS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Advancing technology raises two analytically distinct concerns re-
garding Fourth Amendment protection of private life from govern-
ment intrusion.  First, technology might enable government to
intrude into traditional private arenas.  Second, there are increasing
opportunities for intrusion made possible by technology-mediated so-
cial change.  Though analytically distinct, these concerns are not sepa-
rate and have different valence in different contexts.  Often, both are
salient, as in the context of locational tracking.
The first concern is that technology might enable government to
intrude more easily, cheaply, or deeply into private life.58  This con-
cern motivated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kyllo and Justice Scalia’s
desire that the line at the entrance to the home remain “not only firm
but also bright.”59  This concern also motivated Justice Brandeis’s
memorable lines in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,60 which de-
nied a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.  Advances
in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of ex-
ploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.  “That
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer” was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than
these.61
Technological intrusion into traditional arenas of private life
would be cause for concern even if social life remained static, al-
though it might require the rethinking of timeworn doctrines, such as
the plain view doctrine.62  Resistance to government use of new tech-
58. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001) (discussing the ease and
depth of information government officials can gather with thermal imagers).
59. Id. at 33–40.
60. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
61. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–40 (rethinking the plain view doctrine).
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nologies to intrude into traditionally private arenas motivated
Silverman v. United States,63 in which the Court found the use of a
“spike mike” to monitor conversations occurring among individuals
within a home unconstitutional.64
The critical contribution of Katz v. United States was its recogni-
tion of the constitutional significance of a second and distinct con-
cern—the intrusion made possible by technology-mediated social
change.  In considering telephone calls from a phone booth, the Katz
Court struggled to deal with the way in which social behavior had lost
its “fit” with the traditional contours of the public/private
distinction65:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.66
Though scholars tend to view Katz primarily as a break from ear-
lier case law emphasizing concepts of property and trespass in evaluat-
ing surveillance,67 the idea that the Fourth Amendment might
prohibit a search of a place in which a person has no possessory inter-
est was not new at the time.  Immediately after its statement that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” the Court was able
to cite a list of situations in which Fourth Amendment rights adhere
despite the defendant’s lack of a possessory interest: “No less than an
individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab,
63. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
64. Id. at 506, 509.
65. The somewhat cryptic nature of this formulation perhaps explains why the “reason-
able expectation of privacy” formulation of Justice Harlan’s concurrence has become the
talismanic test of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Halliburton, supra note 30, at 820–23 (explaining that Katz shifted the R
scope of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from typical property cases to that of privacy
and the person); Jed Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 105–07, 115 (citing Katz as the beginning R
of the “modern Fourth Amendment doctrine” in moving from trespass to privacy); Sim-
mons, supra note 10, at 1305 (arguing that courts routinely have erred in interpreting Katz R
as “merely a repudiation of the ‘trespass doctrine’”); Christopher Slobogin, Lecture, Sur-
veillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2009) (explaining that until Katz
it was generally thought that the Fourth Amendment only dealt with privacy interests, and
that Katz allowed for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated in cases where the govern-
ment intruded on personal privacy); Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants,
and the Case for the Courts, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 124–26 (2007) (noting that after Katz
the Court’s notion of physical boundaries “stretched,” thus indicating the willingness of
the Court to adapt).
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a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.”68  Crucially, the Court placed the facts of the
case explicitly in a social context:
One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.  To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private
communication.69
Notably, Katz did not involve telephone calls made from a home
or an office but rather involved calls from a phone booth, a physical
construct given social meaning only by the social role of the tele-
phone itself.70  Nor did the Court’s opinion inquire at any length into
the specifics of the technology used to overhear and record the phone
conversation.71  Although these facts are often elided in discussions of
Katz’s significance, they are critically important for the application of
its principles to a networked society.72 Katz was not about the evolu-
tion of invasive technological means to penetrate traditionally private
spaces.73  Rather, it was about the ways in which technology-mediated
social change had exposed the citizenry to intrusive surveillance.74
Olmstead, which Katz overruled,75 flatly rejected the need to adopt
the Fourth Amendment’s protections to technology-mediated social
change.76  In Olmstead, the Court famously declined to find a Fourth
Amendment violation in warrantless wiretapping of telephone calls.77
Although it recognized that technology had resulted in significant so-
68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (footnotes omitted).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 348.
71. See id. (failing to detail the specifics of the technology used to record the phone call
and referring to it merely as an “electronic listening and recording device”).
72. See supra note 67 (generally noting the varying significances of Katz). R
73. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (discussing the new notion of surveillance without
the need for physical penetration); see also id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment only covers tangibles, like “‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’”
leaving all those technologically mediated social constructs vulnerable to surveillance
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
74. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. R
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53.
76. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (declining to adopt a
policy of protecting phone conversations unless Congress adopted such protections
through legislation), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
77. Id. at 466.
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cial change, the Olmstead Court was unwilling to extend the Fourth
Amendment’s protection to new social patterns.  As the Court stated,
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its
application for the purpose of extending communications,
one can talk with another at a far distant place.  The lan-
guage of the Amendment can not be extended and ex-
panded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole
world from the defendant’s house or office.  The intervening
wires are not part of his house or office any more than are
the highways along which they are stretched.78
By overruling Olmstead, Katz not only severed the Fourth Amend-
ment’s ties to trespass doctrine but, perhaps more importantly, estab-
lished the notion that Fourth Amendment analysis must be sensitive
to both the potential for increasing intrusiveness into conventional
activities and the evolving landscape of social interchange.79  The
ubiquity of telephone conversations did not merely move conversa-
tions that would have taken place in private homes into the telephone
booth, thereby making the content of the conversation more easily
surveillable (because phone lines are easily wiretapped or bugged)
and the noncontent information less easily surveillable (because com-
ings and goings to the house were no longer in plain view of a police
officer).80  The transformation of social life was far more extensive.81
People did not just converse by phone, they had entirely different
conversations.  They sought out local friends based more on convivial-
ity and less on proximity, maintained long-distance relationships with
friends, family, and lovers, made different decisions about where to
work and live, and generally lived different lives than they otherwise
would have lived.82  A telephone system open to unregulated wiretap-
ping by government (and others) would have enabled more intrusion
on individual telephone calls, and perhaps people would have evolved
78. Id. at 465.
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R
80. See, e.g., Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1020–22. R
81. See, e.g., Press Release, BBC, Inventions That Changed the World on BBC TWO
(Dec. 23, 2003), http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2003/12_decem
ber/23/inventions.shtml (highlighting a television program discussing the invention of
the telephone and explaining that “[t]he telephone has not only changed the way we do
business but also led to the development of the internet”).
82. See, e.g., Telephones Have Changed Our Lives, TOPEKA CAP.-J., July 6, 2000, http://find
articles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4179/is_20000706/ai_n11750567/ (discussing how tele-
phone use has advanced since the 1930s).
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entirely different, and more limited, relationships with the telephone,
with deep societal effects.83
When technological infrastructure changes in such basic ways,
the stakes can be very high.  The effect of a particular type of intrusion
made possible by emerging technology on “the security of the people”
cannot be evaluated without an understanding of the role that the
technology plays in the people’s social life.84  Such sensitivity to
changes in social patterns of behavior is important because decisions
about the Fourth Amendment’s contours will affect not only the ex-
tent of government surveillance but also the evolving shape of soci-
ety’s interactions with new technologies themselves.
To say that the issues of increased intrusion into traditional pri-
vate arenas and intrusion made possible by technology-mediated so-
cial change are analytically distinct is not to say that they are
independent.  The same technology that educes change in social pat-
terns of interaction and behavior may also make conventionally pri-
vate interactions and behavior more vulnerable to government
intrusion.85  Additionally, as in Katz, new social behaviors may be in-
herently more vulnerable to existing means of surveillance.86  The two
concerns may be expected to have different valence in different
contexts.
For example, as with the infrared cameras in Kyllo, the increasing
intrusiveness of video surveillance is primarily a result of technological
advances.  Video devices have become cheaper, smaller, and easier to
hide, and video recordings easier to store and to search, thus making
conventional social behavior more amenable to surveillance.87  Simi-
lar potential for invasion of privacy may accompany the deployment of
“smart grid” technology for delivering electricity, which is now being
83. This is, of course, also the case with private surveillance—a subject of great contro-
versy in the Internet context, as well (but beyond the scope of this Article).
84. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“The judiciary risks
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging tech-
nology before its role in society has become clear.”).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining that
through continuous GPS surveillance “of another’s travels,” the government “can deduce
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals
or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts”), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
86. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1967) (explaining that FBI
agents had attached a surveillance “bug” to the outside of a public telephone booth to
eavesdrop on petitioner’s calls about illegal wagers and gather evidence against him).
87. For a discussion of the privacy implications of video surveillance, see, for example,
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Digital Multi-Media and the Limits of Privacy Law, 42 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 551 (2010).
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tested and implemented in some areas.88  Smart grid technology is
aimed at promoting energy conservation and reducing peak loads by
monitoring customers’ use of electricity in time increments of less
than an hour.89  Though the technology is intended to incentivize
changes in energy consumption (by permitting prices to vary depend-
ing on the load, for example), the main privacy concern is the poten-
tial for highly invasive scrutiny of people’s conventionally private
activities in their homes.90
The issue of transactional surveillance is different.91  Advances in
information technology have made it easier and cheaper for retailers
to store reams of transactional records,92 thus increasing the potential
for surveillance of purchasing behavior.  The rise of electronic com-
merce also has changed shopping behavior, allowing people to make
more online purchases, and thereby amplifying the use of credit cards
and facilitating transactional record keeping.93  The social change
here may be relatively minor—perhaps people will use the Internet
(or credit cards, for that matter94) to make more or less the same
kinds of commercial purchases they have always made.95  Even so, this
minor social change combines with information processing and re-
88. See, e.g., Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth
Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, http://
stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/lerner-mulligan-long-view.pdf.
89. See LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 10–14 (2008), available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/
DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages%281%29.pdf (explaining that measurements of energy us-
age taken at precisely synchronized increments may decrease energy use and reduce high
costs to meet peak demand).
90. See id. at 12 (noting that electricity readings “taken many times a second . . . offer[ ]
dynamic visibility into the power system” and explaining how smart grids will “energize
those utility initiatives that encourage consumers to modify patterns of electricity usage,
including the timing and level of electricity demand”).  Obviously, such “dynamic visibility
into the power system” could raise concerns about privacy of activities in people’s homes.
Id.
91. See Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, supra note 10, at 167–69 R
(proposing regulation of transaction surveillance).
92. See, e.g., KENNETH J. BALDAUF & RALPH M. STAIR, SUCCEEDING WITH TECHNOLOGY:
COMPUTER SYSTEM CONCEPTS FOR REAL LIFE 383 (2008) (discussing the advantages of an
electronic “database approach”).
93. Id.
94. See Nielsen, 875MM Consumers Have Shopped Online—Up 40% in Two Years, MARKET-
ING CHARTS (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.marketingcharts.com/direct/875mm-consumers-
have-shopped-online-up-40-in-two-years-3225/ (reporting that “[m]ore than 85% of the
world’s online population has used the internet to make a purchase” and that “[c]redit
cards are by far the most common method of payment”).
95. See id. (“Globally, the most popular and purchased items over the internet are
books (41% purchased in the previous three months), clothing/accessories/shoes (36%),
videos/DVDs/games (24%), airline tickets (24%) and electronic equipment (23%).”).
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cord keeping technologies to lead to vastly enhanced potential for
surveillance.
In the context of locational tracking, both concerns are salient.
Many individuals now carry location-sensitive electronic devices, such
as smart phones or GPS navigation systems, for social reasons quite
orthogonal to the fact that those devices facilitate tracking.96  Simulta-
neously, technology has facilitated government surveillance of citi-
zens’ physical movements to a far greater degree than was previously
possible by making it easier to install and easier to track location-sensi-
tive “bugs.”97  As discussed in Part V, Fourth Amendment doctrine de-
fining the constitutionally permissible scope of government tracking
of physical movement is being reconsidered as a result of these tech-
nological advances.98
E-mail and text messaging fall more toward the social end of the
technosocial spectrum.  Just as the Supreme Court in Katz emphasized
the social importance of the telephone, courts should recognize the
important part that e-mail and text messaging now play in private
communication.99  Once courts recognize this (as they are beginning
to do) it becomes clear that the content of these communications
must come under the wing of the Fourth Amendment.100  The intru-
siveness of the technology is not entirely irrelevant, however, as it sets
the parameters of the debate about where to draw the line between
96. See National Study Shows GPS Adoption Rates Relatively Low, but Offers Recommendations
to Accelerate Market Penetration, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.harrisinter
active.com/NEWS/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1241 (noting that as far back as mid-2007,
“one in six (17%) U.S. adults [already] own[ed] or use[d] a GPS location device or ser-
vice” and that “nine percent of adults indicate that they are very or extremely likely to
purchase [one] in the next 12 months”).
97. See, e.g., David Kravets, Feds: Privacy Does Not Exist in “Public Places,” WIRED (Sept. 21,
2010, 3:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/09/public-privacy/ (reporting
that “[t]he Obama administration has urged a federal appeals court to allow the govern-
ment, without a court warrant, to affix GPS devices on suspects’ vehicles to track their every
move” and warned that “Americans should expect no privacy while in public”).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing how
under the government’s “mosaic theory,” an individual’s movements can reveal private
information), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
99. See, e.g., Kathy Buckner & Mark Gillham, Using Email for Social and Domestic Pur-
poses: Effectiveness in Fulfillment of Interpersonal Communication Motives 13–14 (un-
published manuscript presented at the Home Oriented Informatics and Telematics
Conference, Apr. 6–8, 2003), available at http://www.crito.uci.edu/noah/HOIT/HOIT
%20Papers/Using%20email%20for%20social%20and%20domestic%20purposes.pdf
(describing the role of e-mail in “fulfillment of interpersonal communication motives” and
e-mail’s importance in “friendship development”).
100. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843–44 (11th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases that
“address the issue of Fourth Amendment protection of email content” and noting that the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue), cert. granted, 2011 WL 940891 (U.S. Mar. 21,
2011).
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protected (such as the conversations overheard in Katz) and unpro-
tected (such as the phone numbers deemed unprotected in Smith v.
Maryland101) information in digital communications.102
Social media technologies, on which I focus in the latter part of
this Article, are bound to raise tricky questions because they combine
significant social change with increased ease of surveillance (due to
the data trails they generate).103  The Fourth Amendment’s applica-
tion to these products of technosocial change will have to be deter-
mined.  Justice Scalia was certainly right in his partial concurrence in
Quon when he criticized the Court’s reluctance to take on the issues
raised by digital technology.  He stated:
The Court’s implication that where electronic privacy is con-
cerned we should decide less than we otherwise would (that
is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case
and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our bets
by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opin-
ions—is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.104
As noted in and exemplified by Katz, the Court has repeatedly had to
concern itself with extending traditional Fourth Amendment con-
cepts, such as the protection afforded to the home, office, and postal
mail, to new, but related, circumstances.105  The principle of
technosocial continuity is an important tool for that task.106
IV. THE AGGRESSIVE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND STEPS TOWARD
TECHNOSOCIAL CONTINUITY
Before discussing how a principle of technosocial continuity
would frame Fourth Amendment applications to social networks and
101. 442 U.S. 735, 742–46 (1979).
102. See generally Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1019–22 (discussing how R
“[a]ccessing the contents of communications should ordinarily be a search,” while “access
to non-content information should be treated like access to evidence found outside”).  The
technology’s intrusiveness would, therefore, partially determine accessibility.
103. See Mark Glaser, Your Guide to Online Privacy, PBS (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.
pbs.org/mediashift/2008/02/your-guide-to-online-privacy044.html (“As we share more in-
formation online via myriad site registrations, online social networking profiles, e-com-
merce sites and search engines, the desire by companies and governments to mine that
information is increasingly at odds with the desire of users to protect it.”).
104. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
105. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (affirming that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” implying that as technology expands, so must Fourth Amendment protections).
106. See supra note 30. R
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cloud computing, it is necessary to clear out a bit of underbrush con-
cerning the current state of the law and to illustrate the way in which
some courts, in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, are already be-
ginning to move away from a rigid and aggressive third party doctrine
and toward an approach consistent with the principle of technosocial
continuity.
Beginning in 2002 with articles by Professors Daniel Solove107
and Ric Simmons,108 scholars of information privacy law and Internet
law have spilled a large amount of ink (or perhaps more accurately
devoted a large number of bytes to) bemoaning the dismal implica-
tions for privacy in the Internet era of what has been called the “third
party doctrine” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.109  According to
what was, for a time at least, the accepted wisdom, there is virtually no
Fourth Amendment protection for any information conveyed over the
Internet or other digital intermediary.110  The argument proceeded in
two steps.  First, it was argued that relying on an intermediary means
that an individual assumes the risk of disclosure by that intermediary.
This is primarily because digital activities generally require that in-
termediaries make, process, and store, at least temporarily, copies of
the information.111  Second, and importantly, it was argued that dis-
closure to any third party removes any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to anyone and therefore removes the information
from the realm of Fourth Amendment protection entirely.112
107. Solove, supra note 10. R
108. Simmons, supra note 10. R
109. See, e.g., id. at 1339 (describing how the third party doctrine allows the government
to search every single piece of e-mail); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 10, at 1101–04 R
(explaining that the government’s ability to gather information from third party records
without Fourth Amendment protection can create a Big Brother state and constrain de-
mocracy while failing to ensure government accountability).
110. See, e.g., Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 10, at 1135 (“Miller and Smith establish a R
general rule that if information is in the hands of third parties, then an individual can have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, which means that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.  Individuals thus probably do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in communications and records maintained by ISPs or computer network
system administrators.” (footnotes omitted)).
111. See Simmons, supra note 10, at 1339 (explaining that all electronic data is sent R
through independent third parties capable of recording the address and content of the
data).
112. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (stating that when petitioner
dialed a phone number, he assumed the risk that the phone company would hand this
information over to the government); cf. id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether
privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an
individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on
the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”).
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When one looks more closely, however, this aggressive version of
the third party doctrine, in which any disclosure to any third party
vitiates Fourth Amendment protection entirely, has a very narrow pur-
view.  Indeed, its presumed applicability to all intermediated digital
activity betrays myopia about the social role of such activity, which was
understandable early in this century but is now untenable.
The first, “assumption of risk,” step of the third party doctrine
argument is pervasive in Fourth Amendment law.  It underlies cases
such as those involving searches of garbage left for pickup,113 under-
cover policing and use of informants,114 and law enforcement “fly-
overs” of residential areas.115  In such cases, the Supreme Court holds
that an individual assumes the risk that a law enforcement official will
do what another third party might reasonably be expected to do—
look at something in plain view even if looking requires going to some
effort to peek, befriend an individual and then betray her criminal
behavior to the government, obtain information about someone by
talking to her friends and neighbors, and so forth.  This first step itself
is controversial, especially when law enforcement officers break gener-
ally applicable laws in their searching, and has limits, whether based
on the use of particularly advanced surveillance technology, as in
Kyllo, or on reasonable social expectations, as in Katz.
The second step in the logic of the aggressive digital third party
doctrine is nearly sui generis.  It stems from two Supreme Court cases
from the 1970s, both of which have been subsequently cabined by stat-
ute.  The seminal case upon which the argument rests, United States v.
Miller,116 concerned a defective subpoena for bank records in a case
113. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit “the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for col-
lection outside the curtilage of a home”).
114. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (finding no constitutional
violation when police informants or agents secretly record conversations within a home,
even without a warrant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966) (finding that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer’s misplaced confidences); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) (finding that IRS officer’s entry into an office
under the pretext of offering a bribe was not an unconstitutional intrusion).
115. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (“Because the sides and roof of
his greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was
subject to viewing from the air.”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“Yet a 10-
foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched
on the top of a truck or a two-level bus.”).
116. Miller attracted strong dissents from Justices Brennan and Marshall, was legislatively
cabined by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100–22, 92
Stat. 3641, 3697–3710 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2006)), and a number of states
have declined to follow it in interpreting their state constitutions, Henderson, supra note
10, at 985–1018 (describing jurisprudence of states that have declined to follow the Su- R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 23 29-APR-11 12:17
636 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:614
involving evasion of the whiskey tax.117  The Supreme Court, relying
on earlier precedent involving information obtained by government
informants through conversation, held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bank records and hence no Fourth
Amendment interest in preventing government from obtaining them
by using a statutorily defective subpoena.118  The Miller Court rea-
soned that (1) bank records “contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary
course of business” and (2) “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in re-
vealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government . . . even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”119  Im-
portantly, the Court distinguished precedent providing Fourth
Amendment protection to “‘a man’s private papers’” by construing
the financial records as “business records of the banks.”120
Smith v. Maryland,121 the other pillar of the second element of the
aggressive third party doctrine, considered whether a telephone sub-
preme Court’s third party doctrine in interpreting similar state constitutional provisions).
Despite its rather expansive language, Miller has not been the basis for a vast contraction of
reasonable expectations of privacy any time anyone shares private information with a third
party.  Two cases citing Miller involved the specific issue of financial records.  In those
cases, the Supreme Court followed its holding in Miller. See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc.,
467 U.S. 735 (1984); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).  As of October 30, 2010,
neither case has been relied on by the Court to expand Miller’s approach.  The only other
Supreme Court case, besides Smith v. Maryland, to rely on Miller in any relevant way cited
Miller for the proposition that the government could search a package after the private
freight company charged with transporting it had already opened it. See United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  The Court did not suggest that law enforcement could
have opened the package if the private party had not or could simply have demanded that
the freight company open it, which would be the conclusion under the aggressive third
party doctrine.  Indeed, the Court confirmed that the appropriate scope of the govern-
ment search was confined to the scope of the actual private search.  Since 1980, Miller has
never been cited in a Supreme Court majority or plurality opinion.  Significantly, the two
most recent citations to Miller, in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), and Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), were by dissenting Justices who argued that the major-
ities had failed to extend the logic of Miller in those cases. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 132–33
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
118. Id. at 437, 442–43.
119. Id. at 442–43.
120. Id. at 439–40 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886), overruled by
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).  The Court also referred to the documents as
having been “voluntarily conveyed” to the government by the bank, arguably, if rather
implausibly, limiting even this case to “step one” of the third party doctrine logic. Id. at
442.
121. Three Justices dissented from the majority opinion in Smith, and Congress legisla-
tively cabined it by enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
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scriber had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
he had dialed.122  The defendant argued, based on Katz, that Fourth
Amendment protections applied to telephone calls and that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed
from his home.123  The Court distinguished Katz, emphasizing that
pen registers (devices for recording phone numbers being dialed) “do
not acquire the contents of communications.”124  The Court also em-
phasized the uses for which pen registers were “regularly employed”
and opined that “it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers,
under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret.”125  Citing Miller, the Court ar-
gued that “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equip-
No. 99-508, sec. 301, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868–73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121–27 (2006)), which requires a certification to a court that “the information likely to
be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation” before a law enforcement
officer can deploy a pen register or trap and trace device.  18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).  Some
states also provide more protection to dialed numbers under their state constitutions. See,
e.g., Henderson, supra note 10, at 1007 n.186  (describing how the State of Washington R
used its state constitution to restrict law enforcement’s access to dialed telephone num-
bers); cf., e.g., State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (describing
how New Jersey’s state constitution protects a reasonable expectation of privacy in an indi-
vidual’s ISP account information), aff’d, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008).
Smith has also had quite a lackluster career in the Supreme Court’s later opinions.  It
has been cited substantively in only three majority opinions, the most recent of which was
more than twenty years ago. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (citing
Smith for the proposition that recording the telephone numbers dialed by an individual
through a pen register device does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 n.22 (1984) (same); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
283 (1983) (same).  Although the Court has cited Smith in twelve majority opinions, it is
frequently invoked only in passing as authority for the two-part reasonable expectation of
privacy test derived from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2001) (explaining that the Court applied Justice Harlan’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test in Smith).
Interestingly, while the majority in Kyllo only cited Smith in passing, it was relied on
more extensively by the dissent, which argued unsuccessfully that the collection and analy-
sis of thermal radiation was no more intrusive than the collection and analysis of phone
numbers in Smith. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Kyllo is an exploration of
the limits of the plain view doctrine, which may be thought of as a version of the third party
doctrine in which the third party is often the public at large.  As the discussion by the
dissenting Justices correctly implies, Kyllo itself belies the validity of any all or nothing asser-
tion that third party access to data removes all reasonable expectation of privacy.
122. See Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (“This case presents the question
whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” (footnotes omitted)).
123. See id. at 741 (“Petitioner’s claim . . . is that . . . the State, as did the Government in
Katz, infringed a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that petitioner held.”).
124. Id. (emphasis omitted).
125. Id. at 742–43.
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ment in the ordinary course of business.”126  The Court noted that
“[p]etitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an oper-
ator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy” and was
“not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required
because the telephone company has decided to automate.”127  In the
statement most frequently quoted in describing the aggressive third
party doctrine, the Court said, “This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he vol-
untarily turns over to third parties.”128  Notably, however, the cases
cited in support of this proposition, other than Miller, all deal with
situations in which the government obtained the information via the
voluntary actions of the third party in question (“step one,” assump-
tion of risk, cases).129
Pushed to their outer limits, Smith and Miller have been argued to
stand for two propositions.  First, the proposition that merely by shar-
ing information (such as the financial records of Miller or the dialed
numbers of Smith) with a third party, an individual assumes the risk
that the information will be disclosed to the government by the third
party.130  Second, the far more radical proposition that any informa-
tion in the hands of a third party is open to government scrutiny even
if the third party does not wish to turn it over.131  Under this more
radical perspective, e-mail, which is stored at least temporarily on the
servers of an Internet service provider would be unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment.  The same would be true for all transaction data,
cell phone location data, social network information, text messages,
and data stored in the cloud, leaving only the content of telephone
126. Id. at 743–45 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)).
127. Id. at 744–45.  Regardless of what one thinks of the result in this case, the Court’s
reasoning, which concludes that the adoption of less intrusive technology (here automated
call processing) could not raise a reasonable expectation of privacy, reveals the pitfalls of
any “technological neutrality” principle, see Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, that R
does not sufficiently account for technology-mediated social change.  One might equally
well have argued from technological neutrality that the change from party lines to individ-
ual phone lines should not have raised expectations of privacy in the content of telephone
conversations, since it would have decreased the ease with which law enforcement could
monitor such conversations and increased the potential for telephone calls to be employed
to facilitate criminal acts.  Such an approach would neglect the social reality that the ad-
vent of individual phone lines dramatically increased the social value of the telephone
system, as well.
128. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45.
129. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
130. See text accompanying notes 113–15. R
131. See text accompanying notes 116–129. R
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conversations (presumed to be ephemeral and hence not in the
hands of the phone company) protected under Katz.
The distinction between the ephemeral and the stored has, how-
ever, proven entirely unstable in the face of technosocial changes in
communication behavior, including the use of e-mail, text messaging,
online chat, and voice over internet protocol telephony.  The digital
communications network that includes the Internet is no longer rea-
sonably viewed as simply a “communication provider” like the tele-
phone company (indeed, in light of mobile smart phones and
locational technology even the phone company is no longer a simple
communication provider).  The cyberspace exceptionalists were on to
something after all: Cyberspace has become a space for social life.  But
it is not a separate or exceptional space.  Rather, the digital and physi-
cal social realms are inextricably intertwined.
Applications of the Fourth Amendment to shared sociality in the
physical world are deeply inconsistent with the aggressive third party
doctrine.132  Indeed, a contention that sharing a physical space with
others deprives an individual of Fourth Amendment protection
against all warrantless government intrusion seems ludicrous.  The
Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusion in many
circumstances in which individuals are engaged in the social aspects of
life.133  Most recently, in Georgia v. Randolph,134 the Court held that
132. Professor Jed Rubenfeld also makes this point as part of a broader argument that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment must cut anchor with the expectation-of-privacy apparatus” and
focus instead on the Amendment’s guarantee of security.  Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 115. R
One need not sign on to Professor Rubenfeld’s broader argument against privacy as the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis to adapt a technosocial principle of analysis.
Privacy itself need not—and should not—be seen as an “either or” proposition. See gener-
ally, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2009).
133. For discussions from various perspectives of the Court’s treatment of shared pri-
vacy, see, for example, Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous
Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2005) (concluding that the Court grounds “Fourth
Amendment privacy upon spatial constraints” and intrusions into private places); Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored
Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 245–65 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s post-Katz
opinions are inconsistent with the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of a privacy
interest in transactional data); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?  Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 120–24 (2002)
(describing the Court’s decisions as consistently eroding privacy and promising to elimi-
nate the concept altogether); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or
the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1593–1600 (1987) (arguing “that current
fourth amendment jurisprudence is impoverished and distorted by neglecting the ways in
which privacy embodies chosen sharing”); Crocker, supra note 30, at 2–9 (explaining that R
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence undermines “the conditions of ordinary per-
sonal life shared in the company of others, assumed to be secure in the blessings of
liberty”).
134. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
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one occupant of a shared residence may not consent to a search over
the objection of a co-tenant who is present and making his objections
known.135  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on social
norms, stating that “[t]he constant element in assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great
significance given to widely shared social expectations.”136  Both te-
nants maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared
residence even though the Court previously had held that one tenant
could consent to police entry and search in the absence of the other
tenant.137
This accommodation to social context has deep roots in Fourth
Amendment doctrine.  The Court has found a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a number of types of temporary quarters that an owner
or landlord undoubtedly had some concurrent ability to access, in
items given to a third party for storage or transportation, and in vari-
ous closed containers which were accessible to third parties.138  As Jus-
tice Scalia wrote in his concurrence in the judgment in O’Connor v.
Ortega,
It is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not
solitude.  A man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his
home, for example, though his wife and children have the
run of the place—and indeed, even though his landlord has
the right to conduct unannounced inspections at any time.
135. Id. at 106.
136. Id. at 111.
137. This was the case even if the other tenant was absent because police had arrested
him and placed him in a police car nearby.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166–67
(1974). But see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 611–18 (1961) (finding consent of
landlord insufficient).  For an overview of the development of the Supreme Court’s con-
sent jurisprudence, see Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the
Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 36–46 (2008).
138. See, e.g., Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 12, 15 (1999) (per curiam) (vacationer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in cabin at state park); Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 93 (1990) (overnight guest had reasonable expectation of privacy in host’s home);
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712–14 (1987) (doctor had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his desk, cabinets, and possibly some other parts of his office at a state hospital);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 484 (1964) (warrantless search of defendant’s hotel
room violates Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 49–50 (1951)
(warrantless search of hotel room rented and occupied by defendant’s aunts, where defen-
dant had permission to use it and was given a key, was illegal); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 452–54, 456 (1948) (warrantless search of a rooming house was illegal where
no exigent circumstances existed); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304–06 (1921)
(warrantless seizure of documents by stealth was illegal even though informant was invited
into the office), abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); see also Bellia &
Freiwald, supra note 10, at 152–53 (discussing and citing cases involving third parties and R
physical property).
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Similarly, in my view, one’s personal office is constitutionally
protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even
though employer and co-workers are not excluded.139
Based on this case law, Professor Susan Brenner has argued that
“these entities [digital service providers] are functionally analogous to
‘servants’ who are also encompassed by this conception of shared pri-
vacy; unlike the servants of centuries ago, they do not reside in the
home, but they provide services that promote and sustain activities
within the home.”140  The fact that a servant, landlord, or other per-
son providing services that might entail access to the home might see
and report suspicious behavior to the police has never meant that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy barring the police from
entering.141
In our digitally networked society, the protection of privacy,
rather than solitude, necessitates a technosocial approach to the
Fourth Amendment that continues on the path begun by Katz’s exten-
sion of protection to telephone calls, Kyllo’s protection against intru-
sion by devices not in general public use, and even earlier applications
of Fourth Amendment protection to hotel rooms and shared offices.
Once we move away from the aggressive third party doctrine, in which
every activity involving a digital intermediary is open to law enforce-
ment scrutiny (at least as far as the Constitution is concerned),142 it
will become necessary to confront the issue of Fourth Amendment
protection in the whole range of social contexts making up the inte-
grated online-offline world.143
139. 480 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968)) (finding Fourth Amendment rights in shared office).
140. Brenner, supra note 133, at 76. R
141. See id. at 76–80 (“We trust our ‘servant’ entities not to reveal our personal informa-
tion to tabloids, disgruntled relatives, and other ‘civilians,’ and they generally live up to our
expectations.”).
142. There historically have been, and no doubt will continue to be, federal and state
statutory protections and state constitutional protections over and above what the Fourth
Amendment provides. See, e.g., GINA MARIE STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 7-5700, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/98-
326.pdf; Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amend-
ment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 373, 374 (2006) (cataloging the Fourth Amendment protections in all fifty
states, since the Fourth Amendment itself “provides only a ‘constitutional floor’”).  In this
Article, I focus on the Fourth Amendment, though the considerations raised here should
certainly also inform surveillance law in these other contexts.
143. For important work by privacy theorists emphasizing the importance of social con-
text in evaluating privacy claims see, for example, NISSENBAUM, supra note 132; DANIEL J. R
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 89–100 (2008) (discussing the social value of privacy);
Cohen, Cyberspace, supra note 35, at 219–20 (noting the interconnectedness of cyberspace R
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Recently, some courts have begun implicitly to recognize the
need for such an analysis.  Apparently aware of the sweeping implica-
tions of a blunderbuss approach to surveillance of digital intermediary
records, these courts are increasingly disinclined to take a simplistic
and aggressive third party doctrine approach.  This rethinking is most
apparent in the context of e-mail, which is closely analogous to Katz’s
telephonic communication.  Thus, while courts have generally fol-
lowed Smith and Miller in finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
in Internet subscriber information,144 the few appellate opinions to
consider the issue have found that Fourth Amendment protection ex-
tends to the content of digital communication despite intermediary
storage.145  Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of emails ‘that are stored with, or sent or
received through, a commercial ISP’” and that a warrant is required
to obtain such communications from the intermediary.146  Similarly,
though the Supreme Court did not address the issue in Quon, the
Ninth Circuit had held below that there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the text messages stored with a provider of pager commu-
nications.147  The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applicability
and real space); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives] (noting increasing
“public concern about networked databases of personally-identified information”); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005)
(proposing that courts should consider to what extent a reasonable person would expect
dissemination of personal information after he discloses a private detail, rather than con-
sidering whether he reasonably expected his information would remain private).
144. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 842–47 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing pri-
vacy expectations in e-mail and summarizing case law finding no expectation of privacy in
noncontent information), cert. granted, 2011 WL 940891 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011); United
States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an individual does not
have a protectable expectation of privacy in electronic subscriber information); United
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no
Fourth Amendment privacy protection in subscriber information sent to Yahoo!), cert. de-
nied, 131 S. Ct. 440 (2010); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2008)
(finding, by analogy to Smith’s treatment of telephone numbers, no protectable privacy
interest in noncontent information and declining, on qualified immunity grounds, to de-
cide whether e-mail content receives Fourth Amendment protection).
145. See Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 842–47 (reviewing case law addressing the questions of rea-
sonable expectations of privacy in e-mail content and concluding that qualified immunity
was appropriate because the law is not clearly established).
146. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007)).  An earlier ruling on this issue was va-
cated on ripeness grounds. Warshak, 490 F.3d 455, vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008).
147. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–33 (2010).  As
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of the Fourth Amendment to e-mail and text messaging, but the trend
of appellate court rulings, along with the Supreme Court’s conspicu-
ous failure to rely on the third party doctrine for an easy out in Quon,
suggests that the Court will, at a minimum, eventually adopt a con-
tent/noncontent distinction in the context of two-party communica-
tions,148 despite some of the rhetoric of Miller and Smith.
While the emerging consensus around a content/noncontent dis-
tinction for e-mail and text messaging may provide a means to recon-
cile Smith and Katz for two-way digital communications, Professor Orin
Kerr’s suggestion in a recent article that it can provide a “general
framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet”149 is
overstated.  Not only is there a debate about the extent to which the
content/noncontent distinction can be meaningfully applied to elec-
tronic communication,150 but there is also a dearth of case law con-
cerning the question of how to evaluate the Fourth Amendment status
of online interactions that are not directly analogous to telephone or
postal mail communication.151  One recent, thoughtful district court
discussed above, the Supreme Court reversed the case without deciding the privacy issue
on the basis that the search was reasonable even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See supra text accompanying notes 2–6, 9. R
148. Professor Kerr suggests that the content/noncontent distinction provides a means
to map the Fourth Amendment to the Internet in a “technologically neutral” way—where
content/noncontent replaces a physical distinction between inside and outside.  Kerr, A
General Approach, supra note 25, at 1018. R
149. Id. at 1005.
150. This distinction may work reasonably well for e-mail, where “header” information
plays a role roughly analogous to the address on the outside of a postal mail envelope, but
the content/noncontent distinction begins to break down rather quickly once an individ-
ual moves beyond straightforward two-way communication, such as e-mail. See, e.g., Bellia
& Freiwald, supra note 10, at 163 (rejecting the distinction between content and noncon- R
tent information); Freiwald, supra note 10, at 701 (asking whether “the Fourth Amend- R
ment deprive[s] non-content data of protection while affording protection to content
data”); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,
¶ 49, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf (noting that the content/
noncontent distinction has “authorized increasingly powerful surveillance methods with-
out meaningful judicial oversight”); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Les-
sons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 70 (2004) (criticizing the two category distinction
of communications); Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1417, 1480 (noting that no liability for noncontent monitoring is unwise); Katherine
J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Rela-
tional Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008) (noting that “current Fourth Amend-
ment and statutory schemes provide only weak checks” on the government’s power to
search); Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2105, 2105 (2009) (noting that courts “have yet to offer a means of determining the
content/envelope status of unique aspects of Internet communications”).
151. But see Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. 2010) (permitting discov-
ery of social network postings in tort context over Fourth Amendment objection).
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opinion, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,152 discussed the status of
stored records of the social networking sites Facebook and MySpace
under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) in response to a mo-
tion to quash a civil subpoena for Facebook and MySpace user
records.153  Congress enacted the SCA in the mid-1980s to regulate
access to certain kinds of stored digital content.154  Its interpretation
in the context of modern Internet activities has been the subject of
much discussion by commentators and, to some extent, by courts.155
152. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
153. 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973–91 (holding that the plaintiff was permitted to quash the
subpoena seeking his information with respect to private messages sent on MySpace and
Facebook).
154. Act of Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, sec. 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006)); see also Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 10, at R
123 (discussing the origins of support for the government’s “oddly disparate treatment” of
digital information).
155. See, e.g., Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 1011, at 172–74 (discussing the limited con- R
straints on government under the SCA and the limited remedies available to victims under
the Act); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1436 (2004) (explaining how some of the SCA’s ideas are outdated, including the
idea of remote computing sources, while conceptions of electronic storage under the SCA
are too narrow); Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1503, 1535–42 (2004) (examining recent cases to demonstrate that the statute pro-
tects the rights of commercial enterprises to gather information on users by installing pro-
grams on their computers); Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1025–29 (noting the R
lack of case law discussing the Fourth Amendment’s application to Internet communica-
tions and how the statute has drawn attention away from possible constitutional chal-
lenges); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871–74 (2004) (noting the ability for legisla-
tures, in contrast to courts, to be flexible in enacting technological regulations); Orin S.
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1234–42 (2004) (using case law to demonstrate that the statute is
too complex in some areas and underprotective in others); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1571–76 (2004) (highlighting the gap between the
actual privacy provided by the SCA and society’s basic expectations and understandings of
privacy); Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-Mail “Warrants”: Reframing the Internet
Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1610–16 (2004) (noting the procedural
similarities and differences between the SCA and regular warrant procedures); Paul M.
Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 299 (2008)
(discussing how the government has kept little statistics on its use in comparison to the
Wiretap Act); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 10, at 1141–42 (discussing the less strin- R
gent process for government officials to gain access to stored communications than the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement); Solove, Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at R
770 (highlighting areas of ambiguity in the SCA regarding e-mail that has already been
read by a user but has been left on an ISP server); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1282–85 (2004) (discussing the limited
scope, protective standards, and less stringent enforcement of the SCA than other legisla-
tive acts); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead.  Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 910–12
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Because the SCA requires less than a warrant to obtain stored records,
its constitutionality in the modern context has been challenged.156
Without detailing the court’s analysis under the SCA (which re-
quires the making of subtle distinctions that may have made sense in
the 1980s, but make little sense today), it is of interest to note that in
analyzing the SCA issues the court carefully parsed the various types of
interactions occurring on the relevant social networking sites—analo-
gizing the  private  messaging capability to e-mail and the profile and
wall postings available only to a group of authorized “friends” to post-
ings on a private bulletin board system.157  The court remanded to the
magistrate for a review of the plaintiff’s privacy settings to determine
whether “the general public had access to plaintiff’s Facebook wall
and MySpace comments, or access was limited to a few.”158  Although
the district court in Crispin recognized that Facebook and MySpace
accounts meld more than one type of social interaction—and that ap-
plying legal privacy protections requires an understanding of the dis-
tinctions—the court was constrained by the SCA context to focus on
analogies to earlier forms of electronic communication.159  The
Fourth Amendment imposes no such constraint, making a more co-
herent technosocial approach possible.
Courts have also begun to consider whether there should be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in location tracking information be-
cause of developments in tracking devices and co-evolving social reli-
ance on location-based technology. Earlier cases involving locational
tracking distinguished tracking on the open road from tracking in an
individual’s home. United States v. Knotts,160 for instance, involved gov-
ernment tracking of a beeper that a manufacturer had placed in a
container of chloroform (a chemical used in the manufacture of
(2004) (explaining how the SCA could be applied to allow the government to have access
to telephone calls); see also generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 10. R
156. See, e.g., Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 10, at 123–24 (noting that “no court ha[s] R
considered what constraints, if any, the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures imposes”); Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1034, 1043 R
(“The Supreme Court’s forceful rejection of a warrant exception for telephone bugging
seems to extend naturally to the Internet.”); Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Elec-
tronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 349, 393–97 (2009) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment extends to electronic
communications, meaning that some provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act allowing more government access without a warrant are unconstitutional).
157. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 968–70 & n.9–10.
158. Id. at 991.
159. Id. at 973–91. For example, the court compared recent types of social interaction
with cases dealing with e-mail, text messaging, electronic bulletin board services, and You-
Tube under the SCA. Id.
160. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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methamphetamine) prior to its sale to the defendant.161  The Court
compared the use of the beeper to enhance the government’s ability
to track the defendant on the open highways to the automation of
telephone dialing discussed in Smith.162  Notably, the Court limited
Knotts a year later in United States v. Karo,163 where the court held that
the warrantless monitoring of a beeper similarly placed in a container
was unconstitutional when government officials monitored the beeper
while the container was in the defendant’s home.164
Courts are currently grappling with the increasing ease of loca-
tional tracking,165 which is driven by both technical changes (the ease
of surreptitiously installing and tracking with GPS devices) and social
changes (the availability of extrinsic location data from cell phone
and smart phone providers and other Internet location-based applica-
tions).166  For example, in a recent case considering the standard for
issuing a court order to produce cell site location information
(“CSLI”) under the SCA, a Third Circuit panel reversed a lower court
ruling that the statute requires a warrant based on probable cause, but
remanded for the magistrate to exercise discretion as to whether to
161. Id. at 277.
162. Id. at 280–84.  Interestingly, the Court noted the defendant’s argument that tech-
nologically enhanced tracking might lead to “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen
of this country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision.” Id. at 283 (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (No. 81-1802)).  The Court stated, however, that “if
such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually oc-
cur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional princi-
ples may be applicable.” Id. at 284.  The D.C. Circuit has recently returned to this issue
and held that GPS tracking of an individual for a month without a warrant constituted an
impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment.  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544, 563, 566 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
163. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
164. Id. at 715–17.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214–17 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that installation of tracking device on underside of car in driveway and monitor-
ing defendant’s movements did not constitute search), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–99 (7th Cir. 2007) (track-
ing defendant’s car by means of GPS device did not constitute search).
166. For discussions of the issue see, for example, Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revis-
ited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 PACE L. REV. 927, 960–63 (2010) (arguing that
the use of GPS tracking attached to a motor vehicle intrudes upon a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); Afsheen John Radsan, The Case for Stewart
over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1490–95 (2010) (examining
both duration and intensity of governmental action under the Constitution as related to
terrorism); Ian James Samuel, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1336–51 (2008) (arguing that warrants are constitutionally necessary in the use of many
tracking techniques).
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require a warrant.167  The court also intimated that, under Knotts and
Karo, there might be a Fourth Amendment problem if the records of
location information revealed an individual’s presence at home.168
Notably, the court rejected the government’s argument, which cited
Smith and Miller, that “no CSLI can implicate constitutional protec-
tions because the subscriber has shared its information with a third
party, i.e., the communications provider.”169  The court noted that
“[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location in-
formation with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”170
In another recent opinion, United States v. Maynard,171 the D.C.
Circuit held that law enforcement officials violated the Fourth
Amendment when they installed a GPS tracking device on the defen-
dant’s car and tracked him twenty-four hours a day for four weeks.172
The court read Knotts to have “reserved the question” of prolonged
surveillance by opining that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.”173  The court in Maynard then held that
the prolonged tracking involved in the case violated the Fourth
Amendment.174  Analogizing prolonged tracking to the disclosure of
rap sheets found to violate the privacy exception to the Freedom of
Information Act in the Supreme Court decision U.S. Department of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,175 the D.C. Circuit in-
voked a “mosaic theory”176:
The whole of one’s movements over the course of a
month is not constructively exposed to the public because,
like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the individ-
167. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter CSI: Third
Circuit].
168. See id. at 312–13 (contrasting this case with others involving tracking devices and
explaining that the location information here did not intrude upon residential privacy).
169. Id. at 317.
170. Id.
171. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
172. Id. at 556–57.
173. Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)).
174. Id. at 555–68 (holding that Knotts was not controlling and that the police action was
a search because it interfered with the victim’s expectation of privacy).
175. 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (holding that the disclosure of FBI rap sheets was an
unwarranted invasion of privacy).
176. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62 (describing the “‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by
the Government in cases involving national security information” by stating that “‘[w]hat
may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad
view of the scene’” (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)).
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ual movements it comprises.  The difference is not one of
degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits
and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the
life and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that,
like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story,
may reveal even more.177
A district court in New York recently followed Maynard’s reason-
ing in holding that obtaining historical cell site location information
from a service provider without a warrant violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.178  In doing so, the court explicitly rejected the aggressive ver-
sion of the third party doctrine under Smith and Miller and noted the
importance of technosocial change in evolving Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence:
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Quon when it
alluded to the progression from Olmstead to Katz, the Fourth
Amendment’s concept of an “unreasonable” intrusion into
one’s personal affairs, by its very nature, is not stuck in the
amber of the year 1791. That concept must instead evolve
along with the myriad ways in which humans contrive to in-
teract with one another.  As the threads that connect us are
increasingly entrusted into the hands of strangers who prom-
ise to make those connections broader, more intimate, more
efficient, and more productive, a jurisprudence that mechan-
ically relies on that fact to disclaim the need for meaningful
oversight of the government’s investigative techniques un-
wisely abandons the critical and continuing task of identify-
ing the expectations of privacy our society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.179
The issue, however, is not settled.  Judge Posner, writing for a
Seventh Circuit panel found that monitoring the movement of a car
using a tracking device installed while the car was parked on the street
177. Id.  The distinction between occasional and ongoing surveillance is also reflected in
an earlier Fifth Circuit case involving video surveillance.  United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez,
821 F.2d 248, 249–52 (5th Cir. 1987).  In Cuevas-Sanchez, government agents had installed a
video camera on a power pole overlooking the defendant’s backyard. Id. at 249–50.  De-
spite the fact that the videotaped area could have been visible to observers who chose to
look in from the street or from the pole itself, the court held that the ongoing recording of
activity in the yard constituted a search. Id. at 250–52. The court also held that the govern-
ment had properly authorized the surveillance with a warrant in this case. Id.
178. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn, 736
F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10-MC-0550), ECF No. 11.
179. Id. at 595–96.
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did not constitute a search.180  In response to arguments about the
potential for massive surveillance if such monitoring is not a search,
Judge Posner opined, “Should government someday decide to insti-
tute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be
time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be
interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”181  Likewise, in
United States v. Pineda-Moreno,182 the Ninth Circuit recently held that
location tracking did not constitute a search.183  But, in an extensive
and impassioned dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, Chief
Judge Kozinski, writing for five dissenters, expressed a very different
perspective from that of Judge Posner, warning ominously,
There is something creepy and un-American about such
clandestine and underhanded behavior.  To those of us who
have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feel-
ing of de´ja` vu.  This case, if any, deserves the comprehensive,
mature and diverse consideration that an en banc panel can
provide.  We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and
the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire
and irreversible.  Some day, soon, we may wake up and find
we’re living in Oceania.184
While there is no settled consensus about how to interpret the
Fourth Amendment’s protections in light of evolving locational tech-
nology, it is at a minimum fair to say that the evolving case law in this
area by and large rejects a wooden application of the aggressive third
party doctrine.  In seeking to understand how constitutional protec-
tions should apply to users of social media, courts can and should do
the same by employing a technosocial continuity principle which
looks to the social role played by a particular technology and not pri-
marily to the nuts and bolts of its closest technological cousins.  Be-
cause of the way in which digital technology has become seamlessly
integrated with social and private life in the physical world, serious
protection of Fourth Amendment interests requires courts to consider
how paradigmatic protected contexts play out in the intertwined
networked world and whether new technologically mediated social
paradigms are equally worthy of protection.
180. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998–99 (7th Cir. 2007).
181. Id. (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
182. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-7515 (U.S. Nov. 10,
2010).
183. Id. at 1217.
184. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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V. AT HOME AND AT WORK ON THE WEB
This Part focuses on the ways in which digital networked media
have become intertwined with, and conceptually indistinguishable
from, core Fourth Amendment concerns involving the home and the
office.  The social changes occasioned by the technologies of social
media and cloud computing demand a rethinking of Fourth Amend-
ment protection of these core arenas of private life.185
A. Fourth Amendment Protection of Home and Office
The quintessential arena of Fourth Amendment protection is un-
doubtedly the home.186  The importance of the home in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence can hardly be overstated.187  Because of
the central importance of the home to Fourth Amendment doctrine,
the Court has on many occasions considered to what similar contexts
the protections of the Fourth Amendment should be extended.  For
example, the Court distinguished the protected “curtilage” surround-
ing a home from unprotected “open fields.”188  The Court extended
the protection of the Fourth Amendment to residences that are less
permanent than a house and not owned by the resident, such as
rooming houses,189 rental units,190 hotel rooms,191 state park cab-
185. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532
(2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures] (“Although obvious analogies exist between
searching physical spaces and searching computers, important differences between them
will force courts to rethink the key concepts of the Fourth Amendment.”).
186. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (discussing the
history of the Fourth Amendment and the key significance of an individual’s home); Geor-
gia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (same); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
(2001) (same).  For particularly impassioned recent defenses of the importance of Fourth
Amendment protection of the home, see also United States v. Lemus, 596 F.3d 512, 513
(9th Cir.) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 129 (2010); United States v.
Black, 482 F.3d 1044, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“At the risk of belaboring
the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly
one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”).
188. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (distinguishing
“open areas of an industrial plant complex” from “‘curtilage’”); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 181, 183–84 (1984) (concluding that an individual has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in “open fields”); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (declin-
ing to extend Fourth Amendment protections to “open fields”).
189. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 452, 455 (1948) (concluding that the
Fourth Amendment protects a defendant in a rented room), abrogated by Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
190. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112 (discussing that a tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated in a search); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 610, 618 (1961) (find-
ing a Fourth Amendment violation in a search of petitioner’s rented home).
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ins,192 and mobile homes.193  The Court required warrants for admin-
istrative searches of homes,194 and has recognized Fourth
Amendment rights of those who share their homes with others195 and
of at least some residential guests.196  Although the protection of pri-
vacy in the home is certainly not absolute,197 the Court routinely cab-
ins the ability even of those law enforcement agents who have
obtained legitimate access to the home to rummage around its pre-
cincts indiscriminately.198  Although the issue has come up less com-
191. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1964) (finding the warrantless
search of a hotel room unlawful despite the fact that officials conducted the search with
the consent of a hotel clerk).
192. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 12, 14 (1999) (per curiam) (applying
Fourth Amendment protection to individuals staying in a cabin at a state park).
193. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (holding that the Soldal’s mobile
home was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But see California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 394–95 (1985) (concluding that because the mobile home in this instance was
readily mobile and used as a vehicle, petitioner possessed reduced expectations of privacy).
194. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 298 (1984) (demonstrating “the importance
of prior judicial review of proposed administrative searches”); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that “administrative searches . . . are significant intru-
sions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
195. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106 (“We hold that . . . a physically present co-occupant’s
stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and
invalid as to him.”); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546 (1968) (finding a Fourth
Amendment violation where petitioner’s grandmother consented to search); Amos v.
United States 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (“The contention that the constitutional rights of
defendant were waived when his wife admitted to his home the government officers, who
came, without warrant, demanding admission to make search of it under government au-
thority, cannot be entertained.”).
196. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1990) (holding that police violated peti-
tioner’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching a house where he was an overnight guest).
But see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89–91 (1998) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of nonovernight guests of an apartment, who were simply present for a busi-
ness, rather than a personal, transaction, were not violated when a police officer looked
through a window and saw respondents bagging cocaine).
197. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400, 406–07 (2006) (discussing the
scope of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 447–48, 452 (1989) (finding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in surveil-
lance of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 210, 215 (1986) (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
in garden viewable from navigable airspace); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43
(1976) (discussing the hot pursuit exception).
198. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327–28 (1990) (requiring that an officer have
articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts leading to a reasonable belief
that a space (in this case, a basement) contained a dangerous thing or individual before
making an unwarranted “protective sweep”); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
205–06, 222 (1981) (finding that the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant to
make a legal search of a third party’s home when law enforcement execute a warranted
arrest in the third party’s home); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 387, 395 (1978) (finding
a search impermissible even though a homicide had recently occurred in the apartment);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753–54, 768 (1969) (finding a violation of the Fourth
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 39 29-APR-11 12:17
652 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:614
monly in the case law, the Court also provides expansive protection to
an individual’s office, even if that office is shared with other workers
or accessible by an employer.199
The primary exception to the solicitousness with which the Court
treats the home and office arises in cases involving informants and
undercover agents.  The Court has routinely refused to grant Fourth
Amendment protection against deception by informers and govern-
ment agents.200  The government’s agents are free to gain consensual
access to an individual’s home or office (or, more generally, to her
confidence) by deceit or to induce betrayal by her friends or associ-
ates.201  No court has held that the Constitution protects against mis-
Amendment where police officers obtained an arrest warrant, but not a search warrant,
and had the occupants of the house open drawers and move items around to facilitate a
search); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304–06 (1921) (finding a violation of the
Fourth Amendment where the searchers came under the guise of a personal visit), abro-
gated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
199. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718–19 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(finding that a reasonable expectation of privacy in an office desk and cabinets); See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967) (finding a warrant was needed when searching
commercial property not open to the public).  Moreover, no one has ever suggested that
the government violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by the fact that various
people are invited into an individual’s home or office.  Family, friends, neighbors, repair
people, babysitters, housecleaners, and co-workers come and go, some may even be given
keys and allowed access when the primary resident is not on the premises, yet the sugges-
tion that this access leaves an individual’s home open to warrantless search or surveillance
by the police would be absurd. See, e.g., United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 407–08,
424–426 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a landlord, who at the time was acting as a govern-
ment agent, did not obtain proper consent to enter by calling out “‘[m]aintenance’” upon
entering apartment).
200. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion) (ex-
plaining that recording a conversation does not violate the Fourth Amendment where the
conversation itself would not be protected); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03
(1966) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer’s misplaced
confidence); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 206–07, 212 (1966) (determining that
the Fourth Amendment was not violated when a police officer misrepresented his identity
and was invited into the petitioner’s home under the pretense of a drug transaction); Lo-
pez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) (finding that an illegitimate offer of a bribe
to an IRS official who is in the defendant’s home is not a constitutionally protected
communication).
201. This doctrine is also sometimes called the third party doctrine. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun?  A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amend-
ment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 518–521 (2005) (discussing the development of the
third party doctrine in Supreme Court case law); Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra
note 10 (advocating for the third party doctrine); Kerr, Defending the Third Party Doctrine, R
supra note 10 (same); Kate Vershov, US v. Miller and “Voluntary” Data Handover, c. 2009, R
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.stlr.org/2009/04/us-v-miller-
and-voluntary-data-handover-c-2009 (discussing what the term “voluntary” means with re-
spect to the third party doctrine).  This is a bit of a misnomer since the informants and
undercover officers involved are really second parties to the conversations that they report
or permit to be monitored.  The suggestion that the government can monitor conversa-
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placed trust.202  While this doctrine has held strong over the years
(meaning that in the United States, unlike in Europe, for example,
the regulation of undercover policing is almost entirely a matter for
the executive203), a number of related issues have generated
controversy.
For example, the Supreme Court narrowly held in United States v.
White204 that a government informant could permissibly wear a wire to
transmit conversations to police agents.205  This was the case even
when the conversations took place in the defendant’s home.206  This
controversial outcome led a number of states to take more protective
positions (especially with regard to conversations in an individual’s
home) under their state constitutional provisions, requiring a warrant
for electronic monitoring of conversations with an informant or un-
dercover agent.207
tions with the permission of one of the participants has not been taken to mean that pri-
vacy has been so vitiated by sharing information with another person that government can
monitor the conversation directly without the permission of a party to the conversation.
See Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made Of?, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 781, 813–15 (discussing how courts’ holdings that conversations are unpro-
tected when “there is a potential that an anonymous conversant may breach confidences”
are “pav[ing] the way for holding that private chat room or instant message conversations
may be monitored by the police, even when none of the participants has consented to
interception”); Lawless, supra note 10, at 2–4  (explaining the current status of the third R
party doctrine and how it will need to be “retool[ed]” as technology continues to advance).
This second party doctrine has itself been frequently criticized by commentators who em-
phasize its failure to recognize the importance of shared privacy. See, e.g., Crocker, supra
note 30, at 53–56; Coombs, supra note 133, at 1593–1600; Epstein, supra note 10, at 1202; R
see also generally Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False
Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39
IND. L. REV. 253 (2006).
202. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever ex-
pressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that
a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”).
203. See, e.g., Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover
Policing: A Comparative Study of the United States and Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 569, 586–91
(2004) [hereinafter Ross, Impediments]; Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in
Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
493, 512 (2007) [hereinafter Ross, Covert Surveillance].
204. 401 U.S. 745.
205. Id. at 752–53.
206. Id. at 747.
207. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034, 1037 (Mass. 1987) (find-
ing it was “objectively reasonable to expect that conversational interchange in a private
home will not be invaded” without a warrant); State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 504 (Mont.
2008) (finding warrantless recording and monitoring of conversations constituted a search
and was prohibited under the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287,
287 (Pa. 1994) (prohibiting a confidential informant from recording and disclosing to
police a conversation recorded within a suspect’s home); State v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219,
1220 (Vt. 2002) (holding that the state constitution prohibits secret recordings of police
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Under Supreme Court precedent, although an informant or un-
dercover agent can wear a wire, the scope of what she can do while in
a suspect’s home is circumscribed by the scope of that individual’s
consent to the informant’s presence.  For example, an early Supreme
Court case held that an informant who is invited into a suspect’s home
or office cannot constitutionally seize documents she finds there.208
Moreover, an informant cannot constitutionally plant an electronic
“bug” in a suspect’s home (or even in a container that the suspect will
herself bring into the home)209 in order to monitor conversations oc-
curring in the informant’s absence.  Permissible electronic monitor-
ing is limited to that which would confirm what the agent or
informant would be able to report firsthand.210
B. The Social Significance of New Social Media and Cloud Computing:
Technosocial Extension of the Home and Office
As illustrated by the hypothetical that began this Article, social
media and cloud computing have affected the social space of the
home and office profoundly, and the effects promise to become even
more significant as these technologies evolve.  Not long ago, the home
and office were the primary storage areas for personal documents of
all kinds.211  In the case of the home, these documents often included
financial records (including check books, personal cash account
interviews within a home); State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 190 (W. Va. 2007) (holding
that failure to obtain a warrant for recording information conversations was a violation of
the state constitution).
208. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1921), abrogated by Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Warden v. Hayden, overruled the “mere evidence” rule associated
with that case, 387 U.S. at 309–10, but the limitation on informants’ constitutional ability
to search and seize remains, see, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85
(2001) (finding a warrantless informant-recorded conversation approach inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment); Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 197, 201 (5th Cir.
2009) (listing three specific criteria required for a permissible warrantless search of a
business).
209. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713, 716–18 (1984).
210. See White, 401 U.S. at 751 (“If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating
without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable ex-
pectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations
made by the agent or by others . . . to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustwor-
thiness the defendant necessarily risks.”); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (noting that it is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment when, “without a warrant, the Government surrepti-
tiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained
by observation from outside the curtilage of the house”).
211. See, e.g., Liz Szabo, High-Tech “Scribes” Help Transfer Medical Records into Electronic
Form, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-
10-06-electronic-medical-records_N.htm (confirming that “[w]hile most other businesses
scrapped their paper files decades ago, hospitals have lagged” and are still transitioning
their files from paper to digital).
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records, telephone and electrical bills), health records, personal cor-
respondence, diaries, appointment books, photographs  and other
“keepsake” documents, perhaps attempts at “creative writing,” newspa-
per and magazine clippings, brochures for entertainment options,
and more.  Now, many of these records have moved to the personal
computer or laptop.212  The advent of cloud computing and the de-
mands of a mobile society for easy remote access to all of these
records make it likely that in the future many, if not most, personal
records of this type will be stored online “in the cloud.”213 It will
barely be evident to users where the bits and bytes representing the
documents are physically stored.214  Although books, CDs, and DVDs
are unlikely to disappear completely any time soon, more and more
individuals will maintain large fractions of their personal libraries
electronically.215  These items, too, often will be stored in the
cloud.216
Social media promise to change the face of social relationships at
least as drastically.217  While nothing may ever replace a dinner at
home with family and friends, social media provide other ways to con-
verse, to play games, to pursue hobbies, to share entertainment, and
212. The search and seizure of personal computers raise thorny Fourth Amendment
issues. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures:
Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 39–43 (2002), http://www.
mttlr.org/voleight/Brenner.pdf; Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data,
119 YALE L.J. 700 (2010); Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 185, at 531–35; Paul Ohm, R
The Olmsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and the Seizure of Intangible Property,
2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/ohm-olmsteadian-seizure-clause.
pdf.
213. See Memorandum from John B. Horrigan, Assoc. Dir. for Research, Pew Internet &
Am. Life Project on Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Servs. 1 (Sept. 2008), avail-
able at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Cloud.Memo.pdf.
pdf (indicating that as of September 2008, sixty-nine percent of American Internet users
already used at least one form of cloud computing).
214. Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.
83, 85 (2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916046 (discussing
the increasing use of computers as “workstations” and noting that most individuals will
have a “first-order reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail stored on their behalf” by
third parties).
215. See, e.g., Joel Selvin, MP3 Music—It’s Better than It Sounds, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 8,
2007), http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-08-08/entertainment/17255506_1_audio-quality-
recording-studios-mp3 (explaining how CDs are “on [their] way out [as] . . . computer files
tak[e] over as the primary means of hearing recorded music”).
216. See Memorandum, Horrigan, supra note 213. R
217. Joe Thomas, Social Networking Sites’ Effect on Relationships Among College Students, AS-
SOCIATED CONTENT (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/393599/
social_networking_sites_effect_on_relationships.html?singlepage=thue&cat=41 (confirm-
ing that “[t]echnology is slowly taking over people’s lives and beginning to effect [sic] their
personal relationships”).
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to meet for purposes ranging from political activism to business plan-
ning to romantic intimacy.218  Often these social media supplement
interactions in the physical world or permit them to continue even
when families, friends, and associates are physically separated.219  Akin
to earlier pen pal relationships, these media permit social relation-
ships that cross barriers of distance and culture.220  Social media also
provide means for people with similar interests and concerns to find
one another.221  Sometimes these uses are very personal, involving
medical problems, sexual concerns, or exploration of unpopular polit-
ical perspectives.222  New varieties of social media seem to crop up
almost daily and there is no telling which will become inextricable
pieces of daily life for a sizable number of citizens.223
Social media can be very important enablers of social relation-
ships not only for people who are physically separated from their
friends but also for those, like our hypothetical friend Moira, who are
unable to avail themselves of “real space” privacy, often because finan-
cial circumstances dictate that they live in close quarters with
218. See, e.g., EHARMONY, http://www.eharmony.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (dating);
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (introducing friends);
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (political ac-
tivism); REDSTATE, http://www.redstate.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (political activism);
SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (games, hobbies, and en-
tertainment); SKYPE, http://www.skype.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (business planning);
TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (different means of conversa-
tion within a social group); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2011)
(photo and video sharing).
219. See, e.g., Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2011) (describing how Facebook gives “people the power to share and make
the world more open and connected”); Skype Ushers in New Era in Face-to-Face Online Video
Communication, SKYPE (Jan. 5, 2011), http://about.skype.com/press/2010/01/new_era_
in_face_to_face.html (describing how “Skype is software that enables the world’s
conversations”).
220. See, e.g., supra note 219. R
221. Of course, there is no denying that social media can also facilitate undesirable—
and criminal—social behavior. See, e.g., Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 10; R
see also, e.g., THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
222. See, e.g., About, THE RED PHOENIX, http://theredphoenix.wordpress.com/about
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (American Party of Labor blog); Be a Part of the WebMD Commu-
nity, WEBMD, http://exchanges.webmd.com/default.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (pub-
lic discussion forum available about medical problems); WebMD Sexual Health Community,
WEBMD, http://exchanges.webmd.com/sex-and-relationships-exchange (last visited Mar.
6, 2011) (public discussion forum available about sexual concerns).
223. See List of Social Networking Websites, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_
of_social_networking_websites (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (providing a nonexhaustive, but
extensive, list of “notable, well-known sites,” excluding online dating websites).
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others.224  Thus, social media provide the potential to redress some of
the inequitable effects of the focus on the home and office as loci of
private life.225
None of this is to suggest that the physical home and office do
not continue to play central roles in social and private life.  The point
is that those traditional roles are becoming intertwined with the digi-
tal world and that this development is the result of a complicated
evolution of culture, transportation technology, digital storage tech-
nology, communication technology, social norms, and more.  The
time is fast approaching—and is probably already here—when it will
be impossible to understand what happens in the home or office with-
out understanding the way in which these environments are inter-
twined with the digital world and hence with third party servers.226
To determine to what degree this affects the values traditionally
guarded by the Fourth Amendment’s solicitude toward the home and
the office, it is important to tease out what this solicitude is protecting.
What is it about the home and the office that make them the histori-
cal bastions of Fourth Amendment protection?  Unfortunately, on this
point one gets little help from either the case law or the scholarly
literature.227  The cases may wax poetic about the importance and
even the “sanctity” of the home and its privacies (and emphasize,
224. See danah boyd, Why Youth [Heart] Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 137–38 (David Buckingham
ed., 2008) (describing teens’ use of online social network profiles to harness mediated
publics and develop their social identities).
225. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 404–05 (1974) (discussing the disparate impact of Fourth Amendment protections for
individuals who live in single houses or well-insulated apartments in comparison to tene-
ments); Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amend-
ment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 923 (2010) (noting that the judicial preference for
protecting the home over other spaces unfairly affects low income individuals who spend
more time in public, as well as residents of mobile motor homes); William J. Stuntz, The
Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1265–66 (1999) (as-
serting that protections under the Fourth Amendment unfairly benefit wealthy, white
criminals by only applying to certain kinds of spaces).
226. There is some potential for this to change once again so as to put more or less of
the stored data physically within the premises of the owner of the data or of dispersed
peers. See The Project, DIASPORA, https://joindiaspora.com/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011)
(presenting the opportunity for Diaspora users to share and control data dispersed
throughout the Internet); Audio & Video: Eben Moglen, Freedom in the Cloud: Software
Freedom, Privacy and Security for Web 2.0 and Cloud Computing, Address Before the
Internet Society, New York Chapter (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.isoc-ny.org/?p=1338 (dis-
cussing alternatives to centralized servers for social media and cloud computing).  The
technosocial continuity principal would continue to apply when and if these possibilities
are realized.
227. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary’s reluctance R
to account for advancements in technology).
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though perhaps with less poetry, the importance of the office), but
the importance of privacy at home and in the office are largely unex-
plained, being deemed, no doubt, self-evident.228  Legal scholarship
delving into the connection between privacy (or other Fourth Amend-
ment values) and the home is scant, though some scholars recently
have begun the inquiry.229  Professor Benjamin Barros, for example,
has recently argued for a more thorough examination of the psychol-
ogy of the home as it relates to a number of legal concepts, but con-
cludes that the necessary psychological studies are for the most part
yet to be done.230
Professor Stephanie Stern has argued that the privileging of the
home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has distorted the law, led
to underprotection of privacy away from the home, and is inconsistent
with psychological evidence demonstrating that “[h]igh-quality rela-
tionships, not the physical home or residential privacy, are what is es-
sential to self and psychosocial functioning.”231  She rightly points out
that an overly rigid adherence to the goal of protecting the physical
home could lead to a neglect of precisely the types of digital informa-
tion discussed in this Article.232  She throws the baby out with the
bathwater, however, when she proposes “replacing the expansive and
formalistic protection of the physical home, and the rhetoric sur-
rounding residential privacy, with a doctrinal focus on substantive pri-
vacy and intimate association.”233  The idea that the home is deserving
of particular protection against government intrusion is deeply em-
bedded in jurisprudence, culture, and popular and legal intuition.
Rather than root it out, we should build upon it in a technosocially
continuous manner.
228. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amend-
ment sanctity of the home and the protections of all intimate details in the home); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (“[R]espect for the sanctity of the home . . . has
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”).
229. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home As a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255,
255–56 (2006) (discussing the privacy implications of a physical home and “the psychology
of [a] home”).
230. Id. at 276–300.
231. Stern, supra note 225, at 928–29; see also Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism R
and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2009) (“The central claim of
this Article is that the psychological and social benefits of remaining in a particular home
do not warrant the vast apparatus of categorical protections that pervade American prop-
erty law.”).
232. Stern, supra note 225, at 918. R
233. Id. at 938; see also Coombs, supra note 133, at 1593–96 (arguing that relational pri- R
vacy should have a place at the center of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of
current neglect of how “chosen sharing” embodies privacy).
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While undertheorized, the special solicitude for the home and
office appears to have its roots in a number of social functions these
places perform that enhance substantive privacy and intimate associa-
tion.  The home has been protected as a place for solitude and intel-
lectual activity, a locus of family and other private relationships,234
and a realm of individual autonomy and choice.235  For these reasons,
government intrusion is particularly offensive because the home ag-
gregates so many of the pieces of an individual’s life into a complete
picture which an individual may not wish to share with just anyone.236
The office shares many of these attributes although, of course, the
relationships it fosters are less personal.
Just like hotel and guest rooms, cloud computing arrangements
and social media of various kinds share many (but not all) of the at-
tributes that motivate strong Fourth Amendment protection of the
home and office.  These technologies are potentially the technosocial
extensions of our homes and offices and, like hotel rooms and curti-
lages, need Fourth Amendment protection.237
Whether a particular arrangement is or is not a technosocial ex-
tension of the home or office may depend on two types of contextual
factors: (1) those relating to the structure of the particular technology
(Facebook, for example, has a very different structure than Twitter),
and (2) those relating to the particular uses to which an individual
puts the technology (some people are selective about Facebook
friends and careful with their privacy settings while others are not, for
234. I say private here rather than intimate because I believe that some of the relation-
ships protected by the jurisprudence of the home and office are private, but not necessarily
intimate.  Relationships with business partners, or with fellow members of political, relig-
ious, or cultural groups (which often meet in homes), are important private relationships
but might not accurately be characterized as intimate.
235. Here, I am well aware of the gendered nature of this assertion.  While a man’s
house may be his castle, a woman’s home has frequently been her prison.  Nonetheless, it
is important to recognize that these values are associated with the home and office and
intended to be protected by Fourth Amendment protection of those places.  Indeed, those
who live partly on the web may be able to introduce these values into their lives through
the homes they make for themselves online more effectively than they may introduce them
into their physical residences.  This is an argument for extension of the treatment of home
to certain online contexts rather than an argument against viewing the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protection of the home as promoting autonomy values.  For discussions of issues of
gender, domestic abuse, and privacy, see, for example, ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 58–81 (1988); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/
Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150–70 (1996).
236. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptual-
izing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002).
237. See supra note 10 (citing articles criticizing the lack of Fourth Amendment protec- R
tion for some digital information).
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instance).  Implementing the principle that cloud computing and so-
cial media may be technosocially equivalent to the home and office
will mean selecting a particular level of granularity at which to deter-
mine whether Fourth Amendment protection applies.  The current
implementation of protection for the home is at a high level of ab-
straction, as is evident in Kyllo’s application of Fourth Amendment
protection to thermal imaging.238  Some people may not use their
homes (and certainly not their hotel rooms) for particularly private
activities.  Nonetheless, the Court takes a categorical approach.  It is
the fact that the home provides the potential base for a fulfilling private
and social life that makes it worthy of strong Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.239  As the Court pointed out in Kyllo, that potential would be
disrupted if the government could peer in without notice to see
whether the occupants were using the home to its full privacy
potential.240
A similarly categorical approach would be appropriate to apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment in the context of cloud computing and
social media.  Storing files in a password-protected portion of the
cloud accessible only to a limited number of people should be the
equivalent of storing them in a file cabinet in an individual’s office or
home (or putting them in a locked storage container).241  The gov-
ernment should need a warrant to look at them.  Moreover, this com-
mon situation illustrates that the content/noncontent distinction,
advocated by some as a way to handle information privacy, is un-
helpful outside of the communication context.
238. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Gov-
ernment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore the details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”), with Stern, supra note
225, at 908 (“[P]rivileging the physical home has adulterated Fourth Amendment doctrine R
by extending the home’s expansive ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection beyond
the relational and domestic core of residential spaces.”).
239. See Barros, supra note 229. R
240. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37–40 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”).
241. For discussions of privacy issues relevant to cloud computing, see, for example,
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COL-
LOQUY 1 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/25/LRColl
2008n25Picker.pdf; Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to Ephemeral
Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365 (2010); Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the
Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 359 (2010); Zittrain, supra note 214; David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the R
Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Comput-
ing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205 (2009).
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Noncontent information, such as the number or types of files an
individual has, should be protected from warrantless government
scrutiny just as it would if the files were stored in a home or office.
The importance of this point is evident when one thinks of one form
of cloud storage that many individuals are likely to use: archives of e-
books.  Prior to the advent of e-book readers, the government would
need a warrant to look at one’s personal library—even if only to count
the books.242  Certainly, the government would need a warrant to look
at the titles.  Even more personal, of course, is information about
where a person has placed her bookmark and which books she is cur-
rently actively reading.  None of this is communication content in any
ordinary sense of the term, but surely it should be protected under a
principle of technosocial continuity.243
A content/noncontent distinction will not draw the appropriate
line in these cases, and is unnecessarily complicated in these contexts.
Storage in the cloud is a fairly straightforward extension of Fourth
Amendment protection if one acknowledges its social equivalence to
storage at home or in the office, rather than struggling to determine
whether book titles and page numbers are content.  Cloud comput-
ing, which includes not just data storage but also data processing, may
raise somewhat more difficult issues.  Technosocial continuity de-
mands at the very least that a mere relocation of calculations from an
account book to a personal computer and then to the cloud not un-
dermine Fourth Amendment protections.
The question of how to deal with the growing variety of social
media is more difficult.  Nonetheless, it may still be possible to deter-
mine categorically, from the structure of a given social media plat-
form, whether it is acting as an extension of the home or office.
Generally, if the “occupant” of the site controls access, and does not
make it accessible to the public at large, requiring that law enforce-
ment officials obtain a warrant in order to search the activity records
of the site seems reasonable.244  The fact that the occupant of the site
is not the owner of the servers that maintain the data may be no more
242. See generally supra notes 186–99 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Amend- R
ment protections for the individual home and its contents).
243. For critiques of the content/noncontent distinction, see supra note 150. R
244. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 199 (noting two cases, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. R
709 (1987), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), where sequestering an area away
from the public created a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment).
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relevant than the fact that the resident of a rented apartment or hotel
room is not the owner of that property.245
Nor should it be decisive that the provider of a social media plat-
form has access to the site for certain purposes, such as maintenance
or automated parsing of the site to provide personalized advertis-
ing.246  Though no direct analog to personalized advertising existed in
earlier contexts involving privacy of the home or office, it is nonethe-
less entirely consistent with earlier treatment of the home to note that
private arrangements allow entrance of property “management” for
various purposes related to the terms under which access to the prop-
erty is permitted.  Those private arrangements do not undercut the
constitutional treatment of a particular location as a home, office, or
hotel room, and that access is not understood to give the landlord or
hotel owner carte blanche to permit law enforcement officials to rum-
mage through a residence or office.  Nor do most cases considering
the Fourth Amendment status of various places spend time carefully
reading the leases and private contracts that control the arrangements
between those who reside or work in a rented space and the “platform
providers.”247
245. See supra note 199 (citing O’Connor where the building and cabinets were owned by R
the state employer, but where the expectation of privacy was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
246. This point may require rethinking of the dictum in Smith that the phone com-
pany’s automation of telephone dialing was irrelevant to the determination that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers.  That point, awkwardly made in the
opinion, is better understood as supporting a distinction between addressing information
and content for communications. See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581 (2011) (arguing that courts should interpret the Fourth Amend-
ment as drawing a line with regard to third party exposure between automated processing
and exposure to humans).  While there are problems with automated data processing, see,
e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protection, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822 (2010) [hereinafter Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise]; Da-
nielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008),  individuals
adapt their social behavior and expectations of privacy in response to whether they believe
an automated system or a human being is monitoring them.
247. When determining the validity of consent to a government search, courts do con-
cern themselves with details of the access permitted to those, such as family, roommates,
co-workers, and employers, who have some rights to co-occupy a particular home or office.
Social network providers, however, are more appropriately analogized to landlords than to
roommates or employers.  On the other side, when courts have been inclined to find no
Fourth Amendment protection—as in United States v. Miller, in particular—they have not
been persuaded by arguments that the parties had entered into confidentiality arrange-
ments.  425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976). Miller may have been wrong in analyzing bank
records as “business records of the banks” and “negotiable instruments to be used in com-
mercial transactions” and comparing them to information imparted in conversation rather
than the analog of private papers. Id. at 440–42.  A similar analysis in today’s world of
ATMs and online banking might weigh even more heavily in favor of treatment of bank
records as the technosocial equivalents of private “papers.”  Ohm, supra note 150, at R
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For this reason, whether to treat a particular social media plat-
form as an extension of the home or office should depend primarily
on whether the platform generally is set up for the kinds of social
interactions typical of a home—conversation, sharing of photos and
other items of interest, playing games and so forth—and whether the
individual “residing” at the site has granted access to the public at
large or maintained control over who can enter.  The district court in
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc. asked the appropriate question in its
SCA analysis: whether, “assuming privacy settings are optional, [the
‘resident’] chose privacy settings that would support a finding that his
[social media sites are] sufficiently restricted that they are not readily
available to the general public.”248  Just as in determining whether to
treat a physical space as a residence, the Supreme Court should not
inquire too closely into the specific uses an individual chooses to
make of an online social space; an individual does not have a lesser
basic expectation of privacy against the government in her home sim-
ply because she gives frequent parties or has a large number of
guests.249
Similarly, the detailed privacy settings an individual has chosen—
as long as they are restrictive against the general public—should not
necessarily determine whether she resides at her social media site.250
As the Crispin court said in the related context of the SCA:
1421–47 (“calling for a ban on at least the most invasive forms of ISP monitoring”).
Whatever the outcome of such an analysis would or should be, the point remains that the
result is not dictated entirely by the details of the parties’ “terms of service.”
248. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
249. The Court does, however, consider whether a person has essentially turned his
home into a commercial venue for illegal activities. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 90–91 (1998) (“Respondents . . . were obviously not overnight guests, but were essen-
tially present for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours.”);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“But when, as here, the home is con-
verted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting
unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on
in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street.”).  This distinction seems to have influenced the
Court’s approach to the informant cases. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971) (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police.  If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness,
the association will very probably end or never materialize.  But if he has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”).
250. Note that available privacy settings may be subject to frequent change and may
permit more or less granular determinations of who is given access to what pieces of an
individual’s social network site. See, e.g., Riva Richmond, A Guide to Facebook’s New Privacy
Settings, N.Y. TIMES: GADGETWISE (May 27, 2010, 4:41 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/05/27/5-steps-to-reset-your-facebook-privacy-settings/ (noting that “[w]ith the
changes it announced Wednesday in its privacy settings, Facebook will soon be giving users
significantly more control over their information”).
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Although here a large number of users, i.e., all of plaintiff’s
Facebook friends, might access the storage and attendant re-
trieval/display mechanism, the number of users who can
view the stored message has no legal significance.  Indeed,
basing a rule on the number of users who can access infor-
mation would result in arbitrary line-drawing and likely in
the anomalous result that businesses such as law firms, which
may have thousands of employees who can access documents
in storage, would be excluded from the statute.251
A categorical approach based on the type of platform and
whether the account owner has closed it off from public view is the
best starting point for determining whether a cloud computing or so-
cial media account generally warrants treatment as a technosocial ex-
tension of the home or office.
C. Beyond the Third Party Doctrine: Plain View and Undercover Cops
on Social Media and in the Cloud
Determining that a social media site is the technosocial extension
of a home or office, and therefore concluding that the Fourth
Amendment would generally require a government agent to obtain a
warrant in order to gain access to the site through the platform prov-
iders, is only the very beginning of the inquiry.  Once the overly ag-
gressive interpretation of the third party doctrine is jettisoned, we are
left to confront the same kinds of questions that have occupied courts
for years with regard to privacy in the home or office.  There are many
such questions: issues of exigency, particularity of warrants and scope
of search, third party consent, the plain view doctrine, and the activi-
ties of undercover police or informants.  Full treatment of these issues
is well beyond the ambitions of this Article, but in this Section, I will
briefly tackle two of them: the plain view doctrine and undercover
policing.
1. Plain View Online
The plain view doctrine draws the sensible conclusion that the
Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement to close its eyes
against things in the line of public view (or in the line of view of some-
one with legitimate access) even if the items or activities in view are
within a home.252  This means, for example, that if a member of the
251. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
252. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (“Because the sides and roof of
his greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was
subject to viewing from the air.”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986) (“Yet a
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 52 29-APR-11 12:17
2011] HOME, HOME ON THE WEB 665
public could legitimately see into a home from any vantage point
outside of the curtilage, including an overflying airplane, government
agents are permitted to do the same.  The plain view doctrine permits
government agents to use generally available aids to perception, such
as flashlights,253 binoculars,254 and cameras,255 to enhance their ability
to see what is in plain view without treading on Fourth Amendment
rights.  At some point, however, the government’s use of technologi-
cal aids in observing a home crosses over into a Fourth Amendment
search for which a warrant is required.256  The Supreme Court re-
cently elaborated on the question of “how much technological en-
hancement of ordinary perception from [a plain view] vantage point,
if any, is too much.”257  In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a ther-
mal imaging device to “view” heat patterns within a home was a
Fourth Amendment search, opining that “[w]here, as here, the Gov-
ernment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable with-
out physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presump-
tively unreasonable without a warrant.”258  How should courts
translate the plain view doctrine—along with the limits established by
Kyllo and other precedent—to the context of social media and cloud
computing?
10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman
perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus.”); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,
5–6 (1982) (“The ‘plain view’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contra-
band when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be.”). But see Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (limiting the plain view doctrine to technology in
general public use).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (noting that it is “ ‘beyond
dispute’ that the action of a police officer in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior
of a car, without probable cause to search the car, ‘trenched upon no right secured . . . by
the Fourth Amendment’” (alteration in original) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
739–40 (1983) (plurality opinion))).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that
an investigator’s observation of appellant placing cardboard boxes in a car through binoc-
ulars “did not constitute an illegal search”).
255. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold that
the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is
not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”).
256. Another limit on the plain view doctrine is that the information obtained must
really be in plain view.  A law enforcement officer legitimately within a residence, but with-
out a warrant of sufficient scope, may not open drawers to look for documents or even turn
over a piece of stereo equipment to look at an identification number.  Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 323–26 (1987).
257. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
258. Id. at 40.
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Generally, a sensible extension of the doctrine would be that doc-
uments stored in the cloud or items posted on social media sites that
have no limitations as to who can view them are in plain view.259
Questions will certainly arise as to what types of data mining technolo-
gies can be applied to sweep the Internet in search of suspicious activi-
ties, photos, or statements on publicly accessible portions of social
media and cloud computing sites. Kyllo should be understood as es-
tablishing that new means of analyzing available data can change the
constitutional balance.260  As I have argued elsewhere, “Like the ther-
mal imager in Kyllo, data mining takes data that is already accessible to
law enforcement (the heat radiating from the house was in ‘plain
view’) and transforms it into new knowledge that would not otherwise
be available by constitutional means.”261  In the present context, infor-
mation that can be found by standard search technology in general
public use (such as Google) should be considered open to the plain
view of law enforcement officials.262  More sophisticated data mining
259. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. R
260. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 150, at 748 (“The main contention of this Article is R
that First Amendment freedom of association guarantees must provide an additional
check, distinct from the Fourth Amendment’s protections from unreasonable search and
seizure, on overreaching relational surveillance potential.”).
261. Id. at 799–800.
262. Criminal prosecutions have resulted from law enforcement access to publicly availa-
ble social media sites. See, e.g., Edward M. Marsico, Jr., Social Networking Websites: Are MySpace
and Facebook the Fingerprints of the Twenty-First Century?, 19 WIDENER L.J. 967 (2010); Daniel
Findlay, Recent Development, Tag! Now You’re Really “It” What Photographs on Social Network-
ing Sites Mean for the Fourth Amendment, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2008).  There has been
criticism and consternation about the intrusiveness of the use of Google and social media
sites in situations such as employment or by schools in monitoring their students. See, e.g.,
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE IN-
TERNET (2007); Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Us-
ing Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 453–54
(2008); Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1;
Dave Marcus & Patricia Kitchen, Employers Scour Web for Details on Applicants, NEWSDAY.COM
(July 23, 2010, 2:17 PM), http://www.newsday.com/classifieds/jobs/employers-scour-web-
for-details-on-applicants-1.2133284.  Some countries have regulated the extent to which
employers can use Google and social media sites in evaluation applicants. See, e.g., Frank
Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 285 (discussing Finland’s regulations); Verena Schmitt-
Roschmann, Germany May Prevent Employer Facebook Checks, NEWSDAY.COM (Aug. 25, 2010,
8:06 PM), http://www.newsday.com/business/germany-may-prevent-employer-facebook-
checks-1.2235726 (discussing a draft German law).  It may be that social norms even in this
country will evolve to discourage such methods of assessing candidates.  More likely, and
preferably, people will become more aware of what parts of their social media sites are
available for public viewing and more careful both about posting and privacy settings.  In
any event, I can see no plausible argument for requiring law enforcement to forego simple
access to publicly accessible media or use of commonly available search technology, unless
an individual advocates a radically reconceptualized Fourth Amendment.
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might be sufficiently intrusive to constitute a Fourth Amendment
search, just as some courts have held with respect to sufficiently exten-
sive aggregation of locational data.263  Supreme Court opinions have
repeatedly recognized the danger that technological advances might
turn plain view observation into constitutionally troubling dragnet
searches.264  Under Kyllo, it is an open question whether some data
mining techniques, applied to publicly accessible parts of social media
or cloud computing sites, might similarly cross the line of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.265
Moreover, there will also be complex questions related to the
scope of searches in the cloud even when they are appropriately au-
thorized.  These issues should be similar to those encountered when
searching personal computers.  Indeed, Professor Kerr has argued
that elimination or radical curtailment of the plain view doctrine in
such circumstances might be necessary to avoid the issuance of what
amount to general warrants.266  As the Ninth Circuit opined in one of
the few cases to deal with these issues:
We recognize the reality that over-seizing is an inherent
part of the electronic search process and proceed on the as-
sumption that, when it comes to the seizure of electronic
records, this will be far more common than in the days of
paper records. This calls for greater vigilance on the part of
judicial officers in striking the right balance between the gov-
ernment’s interest in law enforcement and the right of indi-
viduals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The process of segregating electronic data that is seizable
from that which is not must not become a vehicle for the
263. See supra text accompanying notes 152–84. R
264. For discussion of this issue, see, for example, Christopher Slobogin, Government
Dragnets, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2010, at 107.  For an argument for a reconcep-
tualizing of the Fourth Amendment focused on a right of security and a prohibition of
general warrants, see also, for example, Rubenfeld, supra note 30. R
265. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (examining the plain view
doctrine).
266. See Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1047–48 (suggesting that “[b]ecause R
searches of computer data are so comprehensive, courts should not admit evidence of
crimes found in a search pursuant to an Internet warrant unless the evidence under con-
sideration falls within the scope of the warrant”); Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 185, R
at 576–84 (“Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view exception may eventually be
needed to ensure that warrants to search computers do not become the functional
equivalent of general warrants.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR302.txt unknown Seq: 55 29-APR-11 12:17
668 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:614
government to gain access to data which it has no probable
cause to collect.267
2. Undercover Surveillance and Informants on Social Media
The strong Fourth Amendment protection for the home has
never been extended to the use of undercover law enforcement offi-
cials or confidential informants.268  Thus, the walls of the home may
be breached by an undercover agent or informant who deceives the
resident as to her trustworthiness and good intentions.269  Moreover,
under the Federal Constitution and many state constitutions, an in-
formant or undercover police officer can use electronic technology to
broadcast or record any conversations to which she is privy once in-
side.270  Curbs on undercover investigation come almost entirely from
the executive branch.271  United States law differs from the law of
other Western democracies in its permissive approach to undercover
policing272 despite the fact that excessive and inappropriate use of in-
267. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1175–77 (9th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (cabining the plain view doctrine in the context of computer
searches and noting the complexities of searching files stored remotely).
268. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. R
269. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amend-
ment violation when a defendant misplaces his trust in another individual, whom the de-
fendant invited into his office); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“A
government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do
business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the
occupant.”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (explaining that a govern-
ment agent is entitled to disclose a conversation in an individual’s home in which he was a
participant).
270. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (finding no constitutional
violation when police agents use recording technology as a way to obtain evidence).  For a
discussion on how the Court in White could have found a Fourth Amendment requirement
of a warrant for electronic surveillance, see Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing a Wire:
Fourth Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan’s Dissent in United States v. White, 79 MISS. L.J.
35, 40–48 (2009).
271. Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit
Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 81–90 (1987).
272. See Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 573, 575 (1996) (“[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to im-
pose few, if any, restraints on the government’s authority to plant or send covert infor-
mants and spies into our lives.”); see also Amsterdam, supra note 225, at 406–09 (expressing R
reservations as to whether an administrable Fourth Amendment line can be drawn when
police spies and informants are utilized); Epstein, supra note 10, at 1215–24 (examining R
Fourth Amendment implications in the use of undercover pen registers and recorded oral
evidence); Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159–60 (2009) (characterizing undercover operations as “au-
thorized criminality” and calling for strengthened regulation and guidelines); Ross, Impedi-
ments, supra note 203 (comparing the principles and norms surrounding the legitimacy of R
undercover operations between the United States and Italy); Ross, Covert Surveillance, supra
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formants and undercover operatives was a major concern of the
Church Committee investigation into FBI activity that instigated wide-
ranging legislative regulation of electronic monitoring.273
The theory behind the acceptance of deceptive undercover work
seems to be a combination of law enforcement’s need and reliance on
the autonomy of individuals to choose, whether wisely or not, the
company they keep.  The underlying intuition, as is suggested by the
assumption of risk language in several cases,274 may be that this type
of government deception is more likely to ensnare those engaged in
illegal activity than the rest of us.  Lawbreakers will be forced to con-
sort with untrustworthy individuals, thus putting themselves at risk of
betrayal even before law enforcement becomes involved.275  This argu-
ment is not entirely satisfactory, however, since it assumes what the
warrant requirement is intended to determine—that surveillance is di-
rected at those likely to be engaged in criminal behavior.  When the
informant or officer is posing as someone engaged in or seeking to
engage in illegal activity—a drug buyer or seller, pedophile, or prosti-
tute—or even as an attractive potential victim, this assumption makes
sense.  The interaction with the undercover officer or informant takes
place within the context of a criminal act.  In fact, one way to view the
lenient approach that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has taken to
undercover police and confidential informants is as something of a
mitigation of the categorical Fourth Amendment protection provided
note 203 (comparing the same in the United States and Germany); Rubenfeld, supra note R
30, at 133–35 (suggesting that Fourth Amendment standards to restrict undercover opera- R
tions may differ depending on the context and severity of the intrusion into an individual’s
personal life).
273. The investigation culminated in a Final Report of the United States Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
which compiled information on American intelligence activities, as well as congressional
interest in pursuing certain intelligence actions. S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976).  For a discus-
sion of the political decision not to regulate undercover policing, see Ross, Covert Surveil-
lance, supra note 203, at 533–538, and Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political R
Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 628–35 (2004) (discuss-
ing instances of executive orders and congressional acts expanding and restricting
surveillance).
274. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities
must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.  If he sufficiently
doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize.
But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”).
275. See Thomas J. Miceli, Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law 1
(Univ. of Conn., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2006-24, Sept. 2006), available at
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200624 (“The presumption underlying
the use of this strategy is that the target of the solicitation has a predisposition to commit
the crime in question and therefore will likely commit an actual crime if not first appre-
hended by the police sting.”).
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to residences, offices, and their equivalents.  As the Supreme Court
noted in Lewis v. United States,276 if an individual turns her home into
the site of an illegal business, she should not be heard to complain if
law enforcement uses the ruse of being a customer of that business in
order to enter.277
Use of undercover agents and informants in more ambiguous
contexts is more disturbing.  The Fourth Amendment, as currently in-
terpreted, appears to pose no barrier to undercover surveillance of
political and religious organizations or of those simply deemed by law
enforcement, by virtue of their ethnicity or where they live, likely to
engage in crimes.278 Current barriers to such surveillance, to the ex-
tent they exist, are a result of law enforcement guidelines and poli-
cies,279 which are unavoidably motivated in significant part by the
substantial resources that would be required to place officers into
these contexts.280  For purposes of this Article, I will nonetheless ac-
cept the doctrine as it has been applied by the Court in the context of
the physical home and office.  This Section will ask how existing doc-
trines should extend to social media when they are technosocial ex-
tensions of the home or office.
Technosocial extension from the context of the physical home
and office suggests that there would be no blanket constitutional bar-
rier to investigations in which police officers use deception in online
social contexts.281  Undercover investigations online are familiar to
most of us from news reports involving the policing of child pornogra-
phy and pedophilia.  A common scenario involves an undercover of-
ficer posing as an underage boy or girl and visiting a chat room or
other online locale where child predators are suspected or known to
lurk.282  This scenario demonstrates one way in which online under-
cover work differs from similar law enforcement approaches in the
276. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
277. See id. at 211  (“[W]hen, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center
to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is
entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the
street.”).
278. Fisher, supra note 273, at 643–44. R
279. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC
FBI OPERATIONS 31–33 (2008), available at www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/
guidelines.pdf.
280. See John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-
Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1001 (1984) (“The limited
resources of law enforcement usually make it impracticable to conduct dragnet
investigations.”).
281. See Grimmelmann, supra note 27, at 1197 (describing online interactions using cur- R
rent reasonable expectation analysis and third-party doctrine).
282. E.g., To Catch a Predator (NBC television series).
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real world.  As the old comic says, “On the Internet, Nobody knows
[if] You’re a Dog”283—or a forty-year-old police officer.  If the justifi-
cation for permitting unregulated use of informants and undercover
agents is essentially consent,284 and an understanding that individuals
are generally responsible for exercising judgment in the choice of
their companions, then taking away some of the clues one might use
in exercising that judgment might seem to weaken that justification.
This perhaps undermines the force of the consent analysis even in
these chat room contexts.  Although somewhat appealing, such an ar-
gument should be rejected.  Caution in dealing with strangers is nor-
mal and reasonable social behavior, which most of us are taught from
childhood.285  Similarly, anyone who lives part of her life online knows
that spoofing of identities is common in some contexts—indeed, the
ability to try on new identities and speak anonymously is an often-
celebrated aspect of some types of online activity.286  Unless we are
willing to turn the Internet into a very different place in which real
world identities are tightly tied to online identities, those who form
relationships with strangers online in chat rooms must be aware of the
possibility that things are not what they seem.
An online chat room is analogous to a bar or other social club,
but is not the online extension of a home or office and thus is not the
focus of this Section.287  The more difficult issues concerning under-
283. Peter Steinor, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993,
at 61 (cartoon).
284. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this Court nor any
member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrong-
doer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will
not reveal it.”).
285. See Rob McKenna, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Case Management for Missing Children
Homicide Investigation 83–84 (May 2006), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/docu
ments/homicide_missing.pdf (“‘Stranger Danger’ has become a common warning issued
by American parents to children.”).
286. See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642 (1995) (pointing to psycholog-
ical and sociological research supporting beneficial effects of assuming a different “per-
sonae”); Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 143, at 1425 (recognizing that “anonymity R
shelters constitutionally-protected decisions about speech, belief, and political and intellec-
tual association” and emphasizing the importance of “experiment[ing] with preferences
[as] a vital part of the process of learning, and learning to choose”); Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid
of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 173 (1996) (noting the
interest in limiting interactions with others and selectively revealing oneself); cf. Solove,
Digital Dossiers, supra note 10, at 1102–04 (recognizing the importance of not only tradi- R
tional affirmative anonymity in speech and association but also of freedom to read infor-
mation anonymously).
287. Some lower courts are in accordance with this view. See, e.g., United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that the Fourth Amend-
ment protection covered evidence gathered from defendant’s home but did not extend to
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cover surveillance of social media arise in much more controlled envi-
ronments such as Facebook, which purport to require the use of true
identities and are not intended to be fora for anonymous interac-
tions.288  In such an environment, undercover work will require a law
enforcement agent to seek to become a “friend” of the individual
whose site is to be infiltrated or to turn one of the individual’s own
friends into a government informant.  The infiltration could take a
number of distinct forms.  For example, a law enforcement officer
could seek to “friend” the target of the surveillance using: (1) her own
true identity; (2) a fictitious identity; or (3) the identity of someone
the target knows personally. Alternatively, the law enforcement officer
could encourage an informant known to the target to become an on-
line “friend,” arrange to “look over the shoulder” of one of the tar-
get’s current online friends, or take over the account of a current
friend.  Should any of these scenarios raise Fourth Amendment
concerns?
At first blush, the first two scenarios seem easily to fall within the
rubric of the permissive approach taken in the physical world.  It
seems reasonable to conclude that, by inviting an unknown individual
(either the law enforcement officer or her fictitious doppelganger)
into one’s social network, one assumes the risk that this unknown in-
dividual could be virtually anyone—from law enforcement officer to
identity thief.289  Such a lax approach may also indicate that, though
conversations in an AOL chat room because the “[d]efendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the chat rooms”).
288. For example, the privacy policies of Facebook and MySpace require users to submit
personally identifiable information, such as name, e-mail address, and birthdate. Facebook’s
Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK (rev. Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.facebook.com/policy.php; Pri-
vacy Policy, MYSPACE (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
misc.privacy.
289. It may well be that this is a good way to gain entrance to the social networks of
many people.  Famously, in an experiment, a large number of people were willing to ac-
cept the social network friendship of a plastic frog.  Grimmelmann, supra note 27, at R
1185–86.  In fact, open government initiatives have now put government entities directly
on social network sites where individuals may “friend” them in order to enhance their
democratic participation.  Unless people are careful, however, they may end up exposing
their private information to government at the same time.  Citron, Fulfilling Government
2.0’s Promise, supra note 246, at 829–34.   Interestingly, a document produced by the De- R
partment of Homeland Security in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation suggested using exactly this approach as a means to
obtain “an excellent vantage point for [Fraud Detection and National Security] to observe
the daily life of beneficiaries and petitioners who are suspected of fraudulent activities.”
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO FDNS
1 (2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/DHS_Customs
Immigration_SocialNetworking.pdf.  According to the document, “In essence, using MyS-
pace and other like sites is akin to doing an unannounced cyber ‘site-visit’ on a [sic] peti-
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the site is of the type generally deemed to be a technosocial extension
of the home or office, a particular individual is not actually “living”
there in any of the senses deemed important to private life.  Even at
this level, however, it is worth noting that features of the online social
network environment, at least as reflected in a platform such as
Facebook, make any “friendship” with an undercover officer more in-
trusive than a casual friendship in the physical world.  At least with the
current default structure of Facebook, any online “friend”—even one
who simply lurks in the background and does not participate—has
twenty-four hour access to everything on the site, including photos,
conversations with other friends, and in some cases parts of the social
network sites of other friends.290  Because an online friend does not
take up physical space, it may be very easy for the “resident” of a social
network site to forget that the online friend is there.
Furthermore, infiltration of social networks using fictitious
friends is extremely cheap, easy, and safe for government agents to
tioners and beneficiaries.” Id. One wonders whether this kind of wide-eyed innocent
approach to social networks is likely to last, however, especially in light of reported inci-
dents of use of social network information in identity theft and phishing scams.  Indeed,
there is evidence of increasing and more sophisticated use of privacy settings on social
media. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, Students Finally Wake Up to Facebook Privacy Issues, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2010/07/students-finally-wake-up-to-face
book-privacy-issues.ars (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (concluding that the number of students
who use Facebook’s privacy settings has increased); Ki Mae Heussner, Google Buzz Draws
Class-Action Suit from Harvard Student, ABCNEWS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/google-buzz-draws-class-action-suit-harvard-student/story?id=9875095.
290. This description exaggerates the availability of information to Facebook friends to
some extent.  Facebook allows quite a bit of customizing of what information is available to
which people using “Friend Lists.” Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
help/?faq=12074&ref_query=friend+list (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  The available structure
of privacy settings on Facebook changes relatively frequently in both privacy-enhancing
and privacy-destroying ways.  The increasing use of more nuanced social structures than
the blanket tiers of “friends,” “friends of friends,” and “everyone” seems nearly inevitable,
whether on Facebook itself or on some new social networking platform.  Norms and prac-
tices are far from settled, and it is clear that people are sensitive to nuances in how they are
connected to others online despite studies and anecdotes demonstrating profligate posting
of personal information for wide consumption.  Two recent “scandals” illustrate the point.
In one case, Facebook began to use its users’ online purchases as the basis for advertise-
ments to their friends in which they were identified as having purchased particular items.
See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1105, 1119–20.  After an outraged response, the program was discontinued. Id. at
1120.  In another case, Google, in attempting to launch its own social network platform
“Google Buzz,” automatically peopled the social networks of those who signed up for the
service with everyone with whom they exchanged electronic mail using Google’s G-mail
program.  Thomas Claburn, Google Buzz Stung by Lawsuit, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 8, 2010,
2:25 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=223200135.  Again, people were outraged at this exposure of their two-way com-
munication connections, and Google beat a hasty retreat. Id.
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do, distinguishing it from undercover work in the physical world.291
Government agents could easily send out mass friend requests to clas-
ses of people based on information found in their public profiles,
such as ethnicity (perhaps based on names) or political or religious
affiliation, without any specific reason to suspect those individuals of
criminal behavior.292  Those who carelessly accept the requests need
not be actively monitored.  Rather, the fictitious friends can idle,
ready to be activated if the government takes an interest in someone.
If enough people are sloppy about whose online friendship they ac-
cept, the fictitious individual may also pick up credibility through the
friend suggestion tools that many social network sites use to identify
individuals with common acquaintances.293
The extent of undercover surveillance possible in the online
world is drastically greater than the possibilities for similar surveil-
lance in the physical world.  Online undercover activity is simply much
cheaper and safer and the deception much easier.294  These aspects
are socially positive where surveillance is warranted (given that the
online environment also facilitates certain types of criminal activ-
ity).295  Nonetheless, the ease of such surveillance undercuts the im-
plicit assumption of the case law that undercover surveillance will be
limited to those who are conducting illegal transactions.  This raises
additional concerns about pervasive surveillance similar to those
raised in recent cases about locational tracking and about the poten-
tial for over-reaching government infiltration of political, religious,
and other expressive associations.296
291. Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1032. R
292. The idea that the government might conduct such mass infiltration of social
networking sites is not as far-fetched as it might sound in light of past domestic surveil-
lance. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) (documenting specific instances of past U.S.
domestic surveillance); Fisher, supra note 273, at 622–23, 628–35 (same); see also Amster- R
dam, supra note 225, at 407 (rather presciently voicing concern about the day when “sci- R
ence produces robots in the likenesses of men, and government sends them down on us in
droves”); Calo, supra note 28 (discussing technological advancements in anthropomorphic R
designs and their impact on privacy).
293. For example, Facebook utilizes users’ networks, mutual friends, and other personal
information to suggest friends.  Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?
page=925 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  Moreover, this tool may uncover people the user does
not even know.  Id.
294. Kerr, A General Approach, supra note 25, at 1032. R
295. Id. at 1014, 1033, 1044–48.
296. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94–165 (1975) (detailing the results of the investigation by the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities); Fisher, supra note 273, 622–28 (noting renewed interest in surveillance and R
proposing such techniques targeting religious groups and other types of affiliations should
not be permitted unless there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
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Is all of this enough to avoid the rationale of cases like United
States v. White, which held that there is no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion if an informant’s report of a consensual interaction within some-
one’s home is enhanced by electronic recording or transmission?  On
an individual level, probably not, though fictitious identities would vi-
olate the terms of service of many social media sites.297  Social network
denizens are aware of the degree of access they are providing when
they “accept” a friend request298 and the rationale of cases such as
White would seem to apply.  The specter of widespread insertion of
government agents wherever individuals are careless about accepting
friend requests is disconcerting, however, and might change the analy-
sis, just as the extensiveness of locational tracking has been deemed to
change the constitutional balance.299  In any event, state courts that
read their own constitutional provisions more broadly than the Fed-
eral Constitution and reject the analysis of White300 may decide that
their state constitutions require authorization for law enforcement in-
filtration of social networks as well.
The potential for a law enforcement agent to take on the identity
of someone an individual knows raises additional concerns.  This issue
does not arise in the physical world.  Outside of detective fiction, indi-
viduals generally do not have to worry that someone purporting to be
a known friend or acquaintance is actually a law enforcement agent in
disguise.  In the physical world this is next to impossible to pull off.  In
the online world, however, it may not be so difficult (though this ap-
proach is obviously less subject to the concerns about dragnets raised
above), particularly if the individual is chosen cleverly so that it is un-
likely that interactions in the physical world will blow the agent’s
cover.  (An old classmate might be the perfect choice, for example.)
297. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (rev. Oct. 4, 2010), http://
www.facebook.com/terms.php (stating that users may not provide any false personal infor-
mation or create an account for someone else).
298. See Cheng, supra note 289 (explaining that “young people are very engaged with R
the privacy settings on Facebook”).
299. E.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that loca-
tional tracking violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 671 (2010).
300. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034, 1037 (Mass. 1987) (re-
quiring a warrant for electronic surveillance of spoken conversations); State v. Goetz, 191
P.3d 489, 500 (Mont. 2008) (electronic monitoring of defendant’s conversations was a
search that violated privacy provisions in the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Brion,
652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (same); State v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219, 1220, 1225 (Vt. 2002)
(adopting Justice Harlan’s dissent in White that the burden rests with the government to
justify the need to eavesdrop by obtaining a warrant); State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 190
(W. Va. 2007) (requiring a warrant for electronic surveillance of conversations).
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At this point, our Fourth Amendment hackles should be raised.
Although it may be reasonable to have to worry that strangers one
invites into one’s confidence may be government agents or even that
friends or associates may decide to turn informant, as a society we
should find it unreasonable that someone purporting to be a citizen’s
old friend Flo from high school is actually a government agent.  Such
a ruse would certainly be highly unacceptable (and potentially fraudu-
lent) if perpetrated by a private individual.301
Of course, the well-known circularity problem of the Fourth
Amendment is evident in this discussion.  If we know that government
agents might pose as old friends, we can take measures to vet our on-
line friends to verify their identities.  But that is the point of the
technosocial perspective.  Social behavior is contingent on available
technology and on expectations of surveillance.  In the end, the deter-
mination must be a normative one, as it was in Katz.  Given the impor-
tant role that these online extensions of our homes are beginning to
play in maintaining and enhancing our private lives, is this level of
intrusiveness something that a free people should accept from its
government?
The informant examples also raise close questions.  What kind of
access to an individual’s social network site may an informant provide
to the government without triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny?
There are two distinct ways to analyze this issue in analogy to physical
world case law and they lead to contradictory results.  On the one
hand, one might view the informant social network friend as analo-
gous to the informant wearing a wire and hence outside of Fourth
Amendment protection under White.  From that perspective, an in-
formant who permits a government agent to look over her shoulder as
she navigates a friend’s social network site is doing nothing more than
providing the government with a more accurate record of what she
could report from her own visits to her friend’s social network home,
and thus no Fourth Amendment interests are implicated.  On the
other hand, however, an informant who permits a government agent
to look over her shoulder as she roams about a friend’s social network
301. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Fake Social Network Profiles: A New Form of Identity Theft in 2009,
READWRITEWEB (Feb. 3, 2009, 5:36 AM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/fake_
social_network_profiles_a.php (noting the relative ease in creating fake online personas in
social networking sites).  As Professor Kerr notes, the Supreme Court sometimes acts as if
the dictates of “positive law” matter for the Fourth Amendment analysis and sometimes do
not.  Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 517–19
(2007).  A more complete analysis of the potential implications of legal restrictions on
acceptable behavior on the Internet for Fourth Amendment analysis would be worthwhile,
but I do not undertake it here.
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“home” is essentially providing third party consent to allow the agent
to enter.  In most circumstances where an individual has set protective
privacy settings, it will be entirely evident to the agent that the inform-
ant does not have authorization to consent to the agent’s entrance
into the site.  This is even more the case if the agent does not merely
peer over the informant’s shoulder but directs the informant’s activi-
ties on the site, essentially “becoming” the informant.  Moreover, if
the site’s resident has set privacy preferences to allow certain informa-
tion to be visible to friends only, that would seem to be the social
equivalent of standing at the threshold and denying entry, as in Geor-
gia v. Randolph.302
Present Fourth Amendment case law deals with the distinction
between an informant wearing a wire and a government agent per-
forming a search of a home by delineating the conversations and ac-
tivities in which the informant actually participates as the authorized
scope of observation.  For example, courts have held that law enforce-
ment officers may set up video surveillance cameras in a hotel room
where an informant will interact with a suspect, but the cameras must
be turned off when the informant is not in the room.303  Similarly, the
controversial doctrine of “consent-once-removed” permits law en-
forcement officers to enter a home based on consent given to an in-
formant or undercover officer, but, even in jurisdictions that accept
the doctrine, it is limited to periods immediately after the informant
establishes probable cause and the scope of the consent is limited es-
sentially to providing back-up to an arrest.304  Moreover, the doctrine
302. 547 U.S. 103, 113–15 (2006).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 203 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining that no
constitutional violation occurred because defendant was present during the entire surveil-
lance); United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendants
had a reasonable expectation that once the informants left the room, electronic surveil-
lance of their conversation was no longer permitted).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment when undercover agent was
invited into the home, established probable cause, and summoned help from other of-
ficers); United States v. Jachimko, 19 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that consent
was not vitiated merely because confidante turned out to be an informant and not a police
officer); United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that consent was
not vitiated merely because the agent had momentarily left the room to obtain backup);
United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 547–48 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the fact that
arresting officer received help from backup officers does not matter for consent purposes,
particularly since evidence seized was in plain view); United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d
744, 749 (11th Cir. 1982) (determining that consent may carry over to backup officer but is
limited to original consent given); see also United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 613 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that the “consent once removed” doctrine justified backup officers’
entry into a hotel room); United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 807 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the “consent once removed” doctrine applies when agent is invited to residence of
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has been called into question by the Supreme Court’s holding in Geor-
gia v. Randolph, limiting the scope of third party consent in the pres-
ence of an objecting occupant of a home.305
Lines delineating the circumstances in which an informant can
provide law enforcement access to a home are much more difficult to
draw in the context of a “home-like” social media site, since the site
keeps a record of all activity, and at least in many cases, essentially the
entire record is accessible to a friend whenever that friend signs on.306
The bottom line is that the assumption of risk analysis that justified
placing the informant wearing a wire outside of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s purview is more problematic in the context of a social network-
ing site, where access to the site is equivalent to law enforcement entry
against the express wishes of the site’s “occupant.”  When social net-
work sites function as extensions of the home, it may be normatively
reasonable for occupants to expect privacy at those sites against intru-
sions by government officials essentially hiding in their friends’ pock-
ets.  The close balance of White may be tipped in the other direction
by the inability to limit the scope of the government agent’s intrusion
the way it can be limited when an informant is electronically moni-
tored in a physical home.  Certainly those states that have not adopted
White’s reasoning in their state constitutional analyses should be
troubled by the use of informants on protected social networking
sites.
Moreover, the need to obtain court authorization before moni-
toring an individual’s social networking account through access pro-
vided by an informant should not be overly burdensome for law
enforcement.  The informant is undoubtedly free to report any illegal
activity (or reports of illegal activity) she observes on the site to a law
enforcement officer, who may use the information as the basis of a
request for a warrant.  The need for an informant to wear a wire in the
physical world is based at least in part on the ephemeral nature of the
defendant and establishes probable cause); United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th
Cir. 2000) (adopting the “consent once removed” doctrine because probable cause was
established and backup officers acted within constitutional limits); United States v. Akin-
sanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (identifying the three factors of “consent once
removed” to include: (1) entry by express invitation, (2) existence of probable cause, and
(3) immediate summoning for backup from other officers).
305. See Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896–98 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to
extend consent once removed doctrine to include informants), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
306. See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 288 (detailing exactly what information R
is collected from the site and how Facebook uses that information).
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activities under observation in the usual informant context.307  Al-
though postings can in principle be removed from social networking
sites, they generally remain on an individual’s page, meaning that the
urgency to get things “on tape,” which is present in most physical in-
formant situations, is absent.  These features of informant-provided
access to a social networking site, along with the important role such
sites may play in social relationships, suggest that we should read the
Fourth Amendment to require a warrant for monitoring of an individ-
ual’s site through access provided by an informant.308
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapidly changing social role of the Internet and other digital
media requires a rethinking of the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.  To adapt to changing technology, courts must focus not only
on the potential for increasing intrusion into time-honored private
realms, as in Kyllo, but also on the privacy implications of technology-
mediated social change.  This is the message of Katz and the question
with which the Court grappled, but declined to confront, in Quon.
The social role of the Internet and related technologies goes far be-
yond serving as an additional, and parallel, means of communication,
analogous to the telephone and postal mail.
While courts are still grappling with text messaging and e-mail,
society has moved on, integrating the web more and more seamlessly
into the social realm and providing virtual extensions of the home,
the office, and other core loci of private life.  The Fourth Amendment
must respond to these changes if its values are to be preserved for
coming generations.  First, as courts are already recognizing, we must
abandon any aggressive form of third party doctrine that suggests that
any and all exposure of private data or communications to an inter-
mediary or platform provider destroys a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy (if, indeed, it ever really existed) as inconsistent with precedent
307. See Evan Haglund, Note, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1405, 1411 (1990) (identifying “narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and tax-evasion” as typi-
cal crimes involving informants); Informants, What’s Wrong with the Drug War?, DRUG POL’Y
ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drugwar/informants/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011)
(explaining that police use informants in “the vast majority of drug arrests in the United
States . . . [which are] for simple possession—often marking the first time a person en-
counters the criminal justice system”).
308. It is also possible that some lesser standard than a probable cause warrant might be
workable.  I do not intend here to take a side in the debate about whether a sliding scale
approach to the Fourth Amendment would be more appropriate in general. See
Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 134–35 (arguing that a security-based conception of the R
Fourth Amendment might require reasonable suspicion for some government undercover
activities within a home and probable cause for the most extensive intrusions).
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dealing with social life in the physical world.  Second, courts should
adopt an approach of technosocial continuity, acknowledging both
the increasing intrusiveness technology makes possible and the inter-
twined and changing social structure of the physical and online
worlds.
Viewed from a technosocial perspective, much cloud computing
and storage is an extension of the home or office and should be af-
forded comparable Fourth Amendment protection.  Similarly, certain
types of social networking platforms provide extensions of the social
function of the home, connecting people with their friends, families,
and intimates and aggregating the varied pieces of an individual’s pri-
vate life.  These sites should be protected from government intrusion
much as homes are.  In applying the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions to these interwoven virtual and physical private spaces, some
Fourth Amendment doctrines will translate relatively easily and lines
may be drawn analogously to the way they have been drawn in physical
world contexts.  Other cases will raise more difficult line-drawing ques-
tions.  Courts have already begun to recognize this in the arena of
locational tracking, and some have determined that the potential for
ubiquitous tracking changes the balance in favor of finding Fourth
Amendment protection even though limited physical tracking is not
deemed a search.  This Article briefly explores undercover policing
and the use of informants in the social network context as another
example of how technosocial change may require rethinking the
Fourth Amendment’s application.
The goal of this Article is not to construct a distinct Fourth
Amendment regime for the Internet, but to argue that we must zoom
out from the focus on translating the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions to cyberspace and see digitally mediated social behavior for what
it is—an inextricable part of social interaction more generally.  If we
are to maintain a space for private life away from government scrutiny,
the Fourth Amendment’s protections must adapt to the broadened
context in which citizens live their private lives.
